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A. INTRODUCTION
Accessory allocation (AA) or accesoire aaknoping (in Dutch) in this article refers 
to a situation where the court uses a law governing one or more contract(s) to 
govern or infect another closely related contract(s), where the parties have not 
made an express choice of  law to govern all the contracts they have entered 
into in a commercial transaction. This doctrine was recognised and applied as 
a signifi cant connecting factor under the English, French and German domes-
tic private international law (PIL) rules in contractual obligations, and was 
referred to as the “doctrine of  infection” in England, “accessory attachment” 
(rattachement accessoire) or “accessory character” (caractère accessoire) in France, and 
“accessory attachment” (akzessorische Anknüpfung) in Germany.1 Some other EU 
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1 See the English cases of  The Njegos [1935] Lloyd’s Law Reports 286; Ilyssia Compania Naviera v 
Bamaodah [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 107, 112; and Wahda Bank v Arab Bank Plc [1996] CLC 408, 411. 
For the French approach see H Batiffol, Les confl its de lois en matière de contrats (Sirey, 1938) spéc 
no 523, 424–25; Sté des grandes minoteries Bassot et Cie v Crédit foncier d’Algérie et de Tunisie, Judgment 
of  27 October 1943; Gnest v Sté Vibram, Judgment of  14 January 1976; Sté Total Afrique v Serrure 
et al [1982] Revue Critique de Droit Internationale Privé 336; S Corneloup, “Choix de loi et contrats 
lies” in S Corneloup and N Joubert (eds), Le reglèment communautaire ‘Rome I’ et le choix de loi dans 
les contrats internationaux (Lexis Nexis, 2011), coll.du CREDIMI spec 285; V Parisot, “Note sous 
Civ 1ère 12 octobre 2011, no 10-19517” [2012] Journal de Droit International, Comm 20, 1335 
(Convention de Rome du 19 juin 1980 sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles – loi 
applicable au cautionnement). For the German approach see E Jayme, Kollisionsrecht und Bankge-
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Member States such as the UK, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and 
Belgium also applied the doctrine of  AA under their domestic PIL rules as a 
connecting factor in non-contractual obligations.2 Under both Article 3 of  the 
Rome Convention (“the Convention”)3 and the Rome I Regulation (“Rome 
I”),4 the courts of  Member States can use the doctrine of  AA in implying a 
choice of  law between the parties. Some English, Scottish and French courts 
also considered and utilised the doctrine of  AA as a connecting factor under 
Article 4(5) of  the Convention in determining the applicable law in the absence 
of  choice. Article 4 of  Rome I (unlike Article 4 of  the Convention) expressly 
elevates the doctrine of  AA as a connecting factor to one of  special signifi cance 
(through the provisions of  Recitals 20 and 21) in determining the applicable 
law of  a contract in the absence of  an express or implied choice of  law when 
utilising the escape clause or principle of  closest connection. By way of  anal-
ogy, Article 4(3) of  the Rome II Regulation (“Rome II”)5 also expressly elevates 
the doctrine of  AA to one of  special signifi cance in determining the applicable 
law of  a tort/delict in the absence of  an express or implied choice of  law while 
utilising the escape clause.6 Thus, the doctrine of  AA as a connecting factor in 
determining the applicable law in the absence of  an express or implied choice 
of  law of  an obligation is very important and deserving of  special attention.
As the time to amend the provisions of  Rome I approaches closer,7 this 
article seeks to address some fundamental issues concerning the application 
of  the doctrine of  AA in determining the applicable law of  a contract in the 
absence of  an express or implied choice of  law. In doing so, the second part 
schäfte mit Auslandsberührung (Duncker & Humblot, 1977); E Jayme, “Komplexe Langzeitverträge 
und Internationales Privatrecht. Ein Tagungsbericht” [1987] IPRax 63; C Von der Seipen, 
Akzessorische Anknüpfung und engste Verbindung im Kollisionsrecht der komplexen Vetragsverhältnisse (Winter, 
1989) ; S Michel, Die akzessorische Anknüpfung. Grundfragen und Grundprobleme, Thèse Göttingen, 
2004. These German articles are cited in Corneloup (ibid). Prof  Corneloup also observes that 
Swiss law, though recognising the doctrine of  AA under its domestic PIL rules in relation to 
contractual matters, applied it in a restrictive manner with regard to displacing the presump-
tion of  the habitual residence of  the characteristic performer.
 
2 S 12(2) of  the UK PIL Act; s 41(1)(2) of  the German Civil Code; Art 5 of  the Dutch PIL Act; 
Art 133(3) of  the Swiss PIL Act; Art 100 Belgian PIL Code. The author prefers to adopt the 
Dutch (PIL) use of  the term “accessory allocation” (accesoire aaknoping).
3 On the law applicable to contractual obligations [1980] OJ L266.
4 Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations [2008] OJ L177/6. Art 29 of  Rome I 
provides that it shall apply from 17 December 2009. It replaces the Convention.
5 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  11 July 2007 
on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations [2007] OJ L199. It takes effect in courts 
of  Member States only for events giving rise to damage occurring after 11 January 2009 – as 
decided by the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU) in Case C-412/10 Homawoo v 
GMF Assurances SA [2011] ECR I-11603 [37].
6 See also Recital 7 of  Rome I which seeks a consistent interpretation of  the provisions of  Rome 
I and Rome II.
7 Art 27 of  Rome I gives the Commission the mandate to submit a report to the European Par-
liament by 17 June 2013 and if  appropriate to make proposals to amend Rome I.
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of  this article provides a background on the determination of  the applicable 
law in the absence of  an express or implied choice of  law. The third part of  
this article considers the legitimacy, relevance and signifi cance of  the doctrine 
of  AA under Article 4 of  the Convention. The fourth part of  this article seeks 
to provide answer(s) as to why the drafters of  Rome I attached the doctrine of  
AA as a connecting factor with special signifi cance under Article 4(3) and (4) 
of  Rome I. The fi fth part of  this article addresses the nature of  the inquiry 
a decision-maker would be faced with in utilising the doctrine of  AA under 
Article 4 of  Rome I. It also considers the application of  the doctrine to con-
tracts with a very close relationship, such as letters of  credit, guarantees (or 
performance bonds) and counter-guarantees, and insurance and reinsurance 
contracts. The sixth part of  this article looks to the signifi cance of  the doctrine 
of  AA especially as it relates to the weight the court is to attach to it when 
 utilising the escape clause in Rome I. The writer also exposes the dilemma 
that is faced between the proponents of  the strong and intermediary presump-
tion approach in utilising the doctrine of  AA. The seventh part of  this article 
contains the conclusion.
B. DETERMINING THE APPLICABLE LAW IN THE ABSENCE 
OF AN EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CHOICE UNDER THE 
ROME CONVENTION AND ROME I REGULATION
The law that applies to a contract is very important because Article 10 of  the 
Convention and Article 12 of  Rome I both provide that it governs the inter-
pretation, the performance, the consequences of  a breach of  obligations such 
as assessment of  damages, the various ways of  extinguishing obligations and 
prescription and limitation of  actions, and the consequences of  nullity of  a 
contract. Also, although the applicable law does not automatically determine 
the existence or exercise of  a court’s jurisdiction, the applicable law of  a con-
tract is very important because it is a signifi cant factor (and it could be decisive 
as well where it is an express choice of  law) that an English court takes into 
account at the interlocutory stage to determine the existence or exercise of  its 
traditional jurisdiction where there is a foreign element.8
8 Such jurisdiction applies when the Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention and the intra-
UK scheme of  jurisdiction do not apply. See also the work of  P Rogerson, “Problems of  
the Applicable Law of  the Contract in the English Common Law Jurisdiction Rules: The 
Good Arguable Case” (2013) 9 Journal of  Private International Law this issue. Rogerson’s article 
focuses on problems associated with English cases (not involving the application of  Brussels I, 
the Lugano Convention or the intra-UK scheme) where the determination of  the applicable 
law took place in interlocutory judgments on the good arguable case standard in determining 
whether the English courts have jurisdiction over foreign defendants. Some of  the English deci-
sions referred to in Rogerson’s article also feature in this article. The distinction between the 
fi nal and interlocutory (stage of) judgments in determining the applicable law is not the focus 
452 Accessory Allocation December 2013
Article 3 of  the Rome Convention and Rome I in this regard respects the 
parties’ right to make an express choice of  law as to the applicable law. Inter-
national traders, or the solicitors who act on their behalf, usually fail to make 
an express choice of  law for at least two reasons. First, they are unable to 
reach an agreement on the applicable law due to confl icting interests. Second, 
they may overlook the possibility of  making an express choice of  law either 
because of  the haste in which the transaction is concluded, or the commercial 
transaction is scattered in various jurisdictions such as in cases of  back-to-back 
contracts like letters of  credit, or the signifi cance of  making an express choice 
of  law is not appreciated.
Where the parties have not made an express choice, Article 3 of  both the 
Convention and Rome I provide that the court can imply such a choice: in the 
former if  it can be “demonstrated with reasonable certainty”, and in the latter 
if  it can be “clearly demonstrated”, 9 from the terms of  the contract and cir-
cumstances of  the case. The court is to fi nd that the parties have made a real 
choice and not infer the choice as was done by English courts prior to entering 
into the Convention and Rome I.10
If  the court is unable to imply a choice of  law between the parties, it is 
to use the provisions of  Article 4 of  the Convention or Rome I in determin-
ing the applicable law. Article 4 of  the Convention provides that the court is 
to determine the applicable law as the law of  the country that is most closely 
connected with the contract. It also has a proviso which states that a severable 
part of  a contract which has a closer connection with another country may by 
of  this article. The focus of  this article is rather on the signifi cance of  the doctrine of  AA in 
determining the applicable law under Art 4 of  Rome I irrespective of  whether it is utilised at 
an interlocutory or fi nal stage.
 
9 There is no material or signifi cant difference between Art 3(1) of  the Convention and Rome 
I by the addition of  the word “clearly” in Art 3 of  Rome I. There is recent authority for the 
view that the addition of  the words “clearly demonstrated with reasonable certainty” in Rome 
I rather than “demonstrated with reasonable certainty” as was in the Convention is merely to 
bring the English language text and German language text in line with the French language 
text that used the word “clearly”: Lord Lawrence Collins et al, Dicey, Morris & Collins on The 
Confl ict of  Laws, vol 1 (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th edn, 2012), 1809, para 32-059, fn 217; Lawlor v 
Mining and Construction Mobile Crushers Screens Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 365 [3]. See also R Plender 
and M Wilderspin, European Private International Law of  Obligations (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd edn, 
2009), 144, para 6-024; R Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (Oxford University Press, 
2010), 196; PR Beaumont and PE McEleavy, Private International Law AE Anton (W Green, 3rd 
edn, 2011), 444, para 10.70; Okoli and Arishe, supra n *, 528, fn 91.
10 M Giuliano and P Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
(“Guiliano–Lagarde Report”) [1980] OJ C282/1, 17; Lawlor v Mining and Construction Mobile 
Crushers Screens Ltd, supra n 9, [28]–[35]. The Guiliano–Lagarde Report (ibid) provides that as a 
guide, the court can imply a choice of  law with reasonable certainty by taking into account if  
the parties entered into an express choice of  court or arbitration agreement; or if  they used a 
standard form contract such as the Lloyds policy of  insurance in England; or if  the contract 
formed part of  a previous course of  dealings between the parties; or there is an express choice 
of  law in a related transaction between the same parties; or there is a reference to particular 
rules in a statute of  a country.
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way of  exception be governed by the law of  that country.11 Article 4(2) provides 
that, subject to Article 4(5), “it shall be presumed that the law of  the country 
that is most closely connected shall be the law of  the [habitual residence] of  
the party who is to carry out the performance which is characteristic of  the 
contract”. Article 4(5) provides that the presumption in paragraph 2 shall not 
apply if  the “characteristic performance cannot be determined” and it shall 
also be disregarded “if  it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the 
contract is more closely connected with another country”.
On the other hand, Article 4(1) of  Rome I has a structure of  fi xed rules 
(as opposed to presumptions in the Convention) in determining the law that 
applies to the contract of  the parties in the absence of  choice.12 Article 4(2) 
functions as an exception to Article 4(1) by providing that the contract shall be 
governed by the law of  the country of  the habitual residence of  the party who 
is to carry out the characteristic performance.13 Article 4(3) provides that where 
“it is clear from all the circumstances of  the case that the contract is manifestly 
more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 
1 or 2, the law of  that other country shall apply”. Article 4(4) provides that 
where the “law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 
2, the contract shall be governed by the law of  the country with which it is 
most closely connected”.
One of  the important differences between Article 4 of  the Convention and 
Article 4 of  Rome I is set out in Recitals 20 and 21 of  Rome I requiring that 
the court should take into account whether the contract in question has a 
very close relationship with another contract or contracts in utilising the escape 
clause or principle of  closest connection, respectively, under Article 4(3) and 
(4).14 This difference is important because it elevates the doctrine of  AA to 
one of  special signifi cance among other factors such as the language or form 
of  the contract, residence of  the parties, factors that supervened prior to and 
11 This proviso (also known as dépeçage) is to be utilised by a court on exceptional grounds, espe-
cially where the contract is independent and can be severed from the rest of  the contract: 
C-133/08 Intercontainer Interfrigo SC (“ICF”) v Balkenende Oosthuizen [2009] ECR I-9687 [42], [43], 
[45], [46], [48], [49]; Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra n 10, 23.
12 It lists eight categories of  contract such as contract of  sale, provision of  services, immovable 
property, distributorship, franchise, auction sales and fi nancial instruments in which the law of  
the country of  one of  the parties is to apply.
13 This is based on two conditions. The fi rst is where the contract is not covered by para 1. The 
second is where the elements are covered by more than one of  the subparas (a)–(h) of  para 1. 
See Recital 19 to Rome I.
14 This difference is singled out because it is a crucial aspect of  this article. A second difference 
is that Art 4(1) of  Rome I operates on fi xed rules as opposed to the presumptions contained 
in Art 4 of  the Convention. Thirdly, Art 4 of  Rome I, unlike Art 4 of  the Convention, does 
not permit dépeçage. Fourthly, the escape clause as provided in Art 4(3) of  Rome I on the face of  it appears 
to set the threshold of  displacement higher by requiring that the court ensures that it is clear from all the 
circumstances of  the case that the contract is manifestly more closely connected with another 
country before it displaces the rules in Art 4(1) or (2).
454 Accessory Allocation December 2013
after the contract, object of  the contract, place where the contract was negoti-
ated or concluded, reference to a foreign law, currency of  payment, place of  
payment, and the place of  performance.
In interpreting Article 4(5) of  the Convention, the Danish, French and 
English courts generally favoured the weak presumption approach.15 The prom-
inent French judicial approach to making the presumption weak under Article 
4 of  the Convention was in applying the doctrine of  AA as a decisive connect-
ing factor even where other substantial and signifi cant connections strongly 
favoured the application of  the main rule.16 The French approach was infl u-
enced by its domestic PIL rules. The prominent English judicial approach to 
making the presumption weak was by unduly elevating the place of  perfor-
mance to one of  special signifi cance among other connecting factors in easily 
displacing Article 4(2), where the characteristic performer’s place of  business is 
not the place of  performance.17 The English position was also infl uenced by its 
domestic PIL rules that gave considerable weight to the place of  performance 
and little weight to the residence of  the parties.18 The approach of  the Eng-
15 In Credit Lyonnais v New Hampshire Insurance Company [1997] CLC 909, 914 Hobhouse J labelled it 
as such. The weak presumption approach also regards the main rule as a tie-breaker that could 
easily be displaced by the escape clause. There are also alternative approaches to the interpre-
tation of  the escape clause in the Convention – the strong presumption approach, the doctrine 
of  commercial expectations and the intermediary approach. The strong presumption approach 
takes the position that the main rule should not be displaced except if  it has no real signifi -
cance as a connecting factor. The commercial expectations doctrine measures the signifi cance 
of  displacing the main rule based on the commercial context of  the contract. The intermedi-
ary approach aims at reaching a counter-balance or middle ground between the goals of  legal 
certainty and fl exibility in determining whether there are justifi able grounds for displacing the 
main rule. For an exhaustive and comprehensive discussion of  these approaches see also Okoli 
and Arishe, supra n*, 517–24.
16 Bloch v Lima [1992] JCP 21972; Mayer v Deshoulieres [2001] Revue critique de droit international privé 
670. See also M Serge Fourez v SA Residence Le Verseuil cited in Parisot, supra n 1.
17 This approach was infl uenced by Dicey & Morris, The Confl ict of  Laws, vol 2 (Sweet & Max-
well, 13th edn, 2000), para 32-124. See the English cases of  Bank of  Baroda v Vysa Bank Limited 
[1994] CLC 41, 49; Defi nitely Maybe v Marek Lieberberg [2001] 1 WLR 1745 [15]; Samcrete Egypt 
Engineers v Land Rover Exports Limited [2001] EWCA 2019 [47]; Kenburn Waste Management Ltd v 
Bergmann [2002] EWCA 99 [20]–[23]; Marconi Communications International v PT Pan Indonesia Bank 
Ltd [2005] EWCA 422 [66]; Habib Bank Limited v Central Bank of  Sudan [2006] EWHC 1767 
[43]–[44]; Mrs Daad Sharab v His Royal Highness Prince Al-Waleed Bin Talal Bin Abdal Aziz Al Saud 
[2008] EWHC 1893 [74]–[75]; Commercial Marine Piling Limited v Pierse Contracting Limited [2009] 
EHWC 2241 [33]–[37]; Cecil v Byatt [2010] EWHC 641 (Comm) [82]–[94] (this aspect of  the 
High court’s decision was not overturned by the Court of  Appeal in [2011] EWCA Civ 135). 
See also the cases of  Ennstone Building Products Ltd v Stranger Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 3059, 3067, 3070 
and Iran Continental Shelf  Oil Co Ltd v IRI International Corp [2004] CLC 696 [20], [87]–[91], [94] 
where the presumption in Art 4(2) was not displaced by the English Court of  Appeal in both 
cases because the habitual residence of  the characteristic performer was also the place of  per-
formance. 
18 Defi nitely Maybe,supra n 17, [15]; Marconi Communications International, supra n 17, [42]–[43], [66]. 
Admittedly, it could be said that the place of  performance is of  considerable signifi cance as 
a connecting factor under Art 4 for at least two reasons. First, it generally occupies a special 
place in the scheme of  European PIL rules applicable to contracts. For example, Art 5(1) of  
the Brussels Convention – Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of  Judgments in Civil 
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lish courts in unduly elevating the place of  performance as a connecting factor 
was rejected by Lord President Cullen in the Scottish case of  Caledonia Subsea 
Ltd v Microperi Srl19 when he held that “If  the framers of  art 4 had intended to 
attach such signifi cance to the place of  performance they could have readily 
indicated that, but they did not do so.”20 Similarly, Lord President Cullen also 
considered the application of  the doctrine of  AA in this case, and in refus-
ing to apply it as a decisive connecting factor held that it is to be considered 
alongside other factors.21
Lord President Cullen’s view in rejecting the elevation of  the place of  per-
formance and doctrine of  AA as special or decisive connecting factors appears 
to have been endorsed by the CJEU in ICF;22 courts of  Member States are 
required to consider the circumstances as a whole in applying Article 4(5).23 In 
other words, the decision in ICF did not attach special signifi cance to any con-
necting factor such as the doctrine of  AA or the place of  performance while 
interpreting Article 4(5) of  the Convention.
Despite the special signifi cance given to the doctrine of  AA as a connect-
ing factor under Article 4 of  Rome I, its application under Article 4 of  the 
Convention is by no means free from controversy especially in English courts. 
Thus, it is imperative to assess the legitimacy, relevance and signifi cance of  the 
doctrine of  AA under Article 4 of  the Convention as a basis for determining 
the signifi cance and approach to the doctrine under Article 4 of  Rome I.
and Commercial Matters, as amended [1998] OJ C27/1 – and Art 5(1)(a) of  the Brussels I 
Regulation – Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of  22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of  Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2001] OJ 
L12/1 – give supremacy to the place of  performance as a connecting factor in locating the 
forum that is closely linked with the contract. Similarly, Art 5(1)(b) of  Brussels I gives weight 
to the characteristic place of  performance in determining jurisdiction. See also Recitals 7 and 17 to 
Rome I that seek a consistent interpretation of  choice of  law and jurisdiction issues in contrac-
tual and non-contractual obligations. The same provisions contained in the Brussels Convention 
and Brussels I are also mirrored respectively in the Lugano Convention on the Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement of  Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1988 (as given force of  law by 
in UK by s 3A of  the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 as set out in Schedule 3C to 
that Act, as effected by s 1(1)(3) of  the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1991) and 2007 
(Council Decision/2007/712/EC). Secondly, the place of  performance also has commercial 
signifi cance to the parties involved in a contract. However, unduly elevating the place of  per-
formance over other competing connecting factors has no textual legitimacy in Art 4(5) of  the 
Rome Convention. See also Okoli and Arishe, supra n *, at 518–19.
 
19 Caledonia Subsea Ltd v Microperi Srl 2002 SLT 1022.
20 Ibid, [41]. He further states that “[I]ndeed when the place of  performance is such an obvious 
candidate as the test, the fact that it is not mentioned suggests a movement away from it. … 
No doubt the place where the contract is performed is of  relevance, either directly or indirectly, 
but it may be only one of  a number of  factors to be assessed in the exercise under para 5.”
21 Ibid, [44].
22 Supra, n 11.
23 Ibid, [61].
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C. THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ACCESSORY 
ALLOCATION UNDER ARTICLE 4 OF THE ROME CONVENTION
Under Article 3 of  the Convention, the courts of  Member States as a guide 
can utilise the doctrine of  AA in implying a choice of  law if  the parties have 
failed to make an express choice of  law. What remains unsettled is if  the doc-
trine of  AA is a legitimate, relevant or signifi cant connecting factor for the 
purposes of  Article 4 of  the Convention.
Professor Lagarde submitted in an early publication that the doctrine of  AA 
is permissible under Article 4 of  the Convention.24 He expressed the view that
“the presumption is not absolute. … A subcontractor, for example, might be gov-
erned by the same law governing the principal contract between the contractor and 
the employer rather than the law of  the country in which the subcontractor has his 
place of  business.”25
Similarly in the early decision of  the French case of  Bloch v Lima,26 the con-
tract of  guarantee which had no express choice of  law, had strong connections 
with France. The characteristic performance, place of  performance, habitual 
residence of  the debtor and guarantor, and the currency of  payment all had 
connections with France. The Cour d’Appel de Versailles (Court of  Appeal) 
displaced Article 4(2) by applying the doctrine of  AA as a decisive connect-
ing factor under Article 4(5) in using the (Italian) law that governed the debts 
guaranteed to govern the guarantee contract. The fi rst English decision that 
applied Article 4 of  the Convention utilised the doctrine of  AA under Article 
4(5) in determining the applicable law in the absence of  choice with regard to 
a letter of  credit contract.27
Despite the early advancement of  the doctrine of  AA under Article 4(5) of  
the Convention, some judges and academics began to question the legitimacy, 
relevance and signifi cance of  applying the doctrine under Article 4 of  the Con-
vention.28 The principal basis for the argument against the application of  the 
doctrine is that under Article 4 of  the Convention “the applicable law to the 
contract under consideration must in principle be determined on its own with-
24 P Lagarde, “The European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations: An 
Apologia” (1981) 22 Virginia Journal of  International Law 91, 97–98.
25 Ibid.
26 Supra n 16.
27 Bank of  Baroda, supra n 17, 47–49.
28 Samcrete, supra n 17, [40]; Caledonia Subsea Ltd v Microperi Srl 2001 SLT1186 [30] (Lord Hamilton); 
THD Struycken, “Some Dutch Refl ections on the Rome Convention, Art 4(5)” [1996] Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Quarterly 18; J Hill, “Choice of  Law in Contract under the Rome Con-
vention: The Approach of  the UK Courts” (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
325, 340; CG Van Der Plas and THD Struycken, “Torts and Confl ict of  Laws in the Neth-
erlands: Remarks on Haag 12th November, 2004” (2005) 7 Yearbook of  Private International Law 
269, 273; Parisot, supra n 1. Lord Hamilton in Caledonia Subsea Ltd, ibid, regarded the application 
of  the doctrine of  AA under Art 4 as “irrelevant” and “illegitimate” except in interdependent 
contract(s) such as letters of  credit. 
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out reference to any greater transaction of  which it forms part or with which 
it is concerned”.29 It is submitted that there are at least four reasons why there 
was controversy regarding the application of  the doctrine of  AA under Article 
4(5) of  the Convention.
First, there was suspicion that some Member State courts were infl uenced 
by their domestic PIL rules in interpreting the Convention, which did not rep-
resent the international character of  the Convention that promotes uniformity 
by virtue of  Article 18.30 Thus, the application of  the doctrine of  AA to letter 
of  credit contract(s) under Article 4 of  the Convention by English courts was 
infl uenced by reliance on common law decisions.31 Similarly, the attitude of  
French courts to applying the doctrine of  AA as a decisive connecting factor 
under Article 4 of  the Convention to contracts of  guarantee was infl uenced 
by its domestic PIL approach. Admittedly, the domestic infl uence of  some 
Member States’ PIL rules may have provided some early and valuable insights 
that may have been relevant to the interpretation of  Article 4(5) such as the 
application of  the doctrine of  AA. However, the danger of  this approach is the 
possibility of  Member State courts interpreting Article 4(5) through the lens of  
their (individual) domestic PIL law rules, thereby threatening uniformity and 
legal certainty.
The second reason was that the doctrine of  AA was only relevant when 
determining if  the parties made an implied choice of  law under Article 3 of  
the Convention.32 Thus, Potter LJ in Samcrete33 voiced his opposition to the 
application of  the doctrine under Article 4 of  the Convention by a lower court 
judge who applied the law governing a distributorship contract to a contract of  
guarantee under Article 4(5) of  the Convention. Potter LJ was of  the view that
“having accepted the position that the choice of  (English) law under Article 3 was 
not established, the judge erred in treating the choice of  law clause in the distribu-
29 Samcrete, supra n 17, [40].
30 Credit Lyonnais, supra n 15, 914; Raiffeisen Zentral bank Osterreich AG v Five Star Trading LLC [2001] 
EWCA Civ 68 [33]–[34]; Caledonia Subsea, supra n 19, [3], [6] (Lord Cameron), [2]–[4] (Lord 
Marnoch); Samcrete, supra n 17, [25]; Iran Continental Shelf  Oil Co Ltd, supra n 17, [13]–[16]. See 
also Lawlor v Mining and Construction Mobile Crushers Screens Ltd, supra n 9, [30].
31 Bank of  Baroda, supra n 17, 47-49, in applying the doctrine of  infection to a letter of  credit 
contract, placed considerable reliance on the common law decisions of  European Asian Bank 
AG v Punjab and Sind Bank [1982] 2 LI Rep 356, 368 and Offshore International SA v Banco Cen-
tral SA [1997] 1 WLR 399, 401–03. Marconi Communications, supra n 17, [42]–[43] also adopted 
the same position in placing reliance on the common law cases of  European Asian Bank, ibid, 
368; Offshore International, ibid, 401–03; Power Curber International Ltd v National Bank of  Kuwait SAK 
[1981] 1 WLR 1233, 1240–42. See also Habib Bank Limited, supra n 17, [43]–[44]. Also, the 
judges in these three cases (Bank of  Baroda, Marconi Communications and Habib Bank Limited), while 
applying Art 4 of  the Convention to letters of  credit, held that there was no difference between 
what the position was under English common law and the Convention where considerable sig-
nifi cance was placed on the place of  performance over the residence of  the parties.
32 Credit Lyonnais, supra n 15, 916; Caledonia Subsea Ltd, supra n 28, [30]; Samcrete, supra n 17, [39]–
[49].
33 Supra, n 17.
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torship contract as largely determinative under Article 4. In doing so, she appears to 
have overlooked the change of  focus when moving from one to the other”.34
The third reason is that Article 4 of  the Convention is concerned with geo-
graphical connections and not legal systems. In other words, it is concerned 
with the country with which the contract has its closest connection and not the 
legal system of  a country.35 Potter LJ in Samcrete, following the views of Hobhouse 
LJ in Credit Lyonnais,36 emphasised that Article 4 of  the Convention connects 
“the contract to a particular country and giving precedence to the residence of  
the party performing the characteristic obligation, unless the circumstances as a 
whole demonstrate a closer connection to another country”.37 Thus, while fac-
tors such as the residence of  the parties, nationality, central administration of  
a company, place of  contracting and the place of  performance connecting the 
contract with a country were relevant, factors such as the language and form 
of  the contract, reference to a particular country’s statute and the closeness 
of  one contract to another connecting the contract to a country’s legal system 
were irrelevant under Article 4 of  the Convention.
The fourth reason was that little or no signifi cance should be given to the 
doctrine of  AA as a factor under Article 4 of  the Convention when compared 
to other factors. This may also explain why some English judges who consid-
ered the doctrine of  AA under Article 3 of  the Convention, even if  they could 
not imply a choice of  law between the parties, did not deem it necessary to 
examine its signifi cance when applying Article 4(5).38 Thus, in the Scottish case 
of  Caledonia Subsea counsel for the defense argued that the main contract which 
had no express choice of  law should be governed by Egyptian law since the 
subcontract subsequently entered into between the parties was expressly gov-
erned by Egyptian law. The counsel relied on the views of  Professor Lagarde 
endorsing the doctrine of  AA. Lord President Cullen attached little signifi cance 
34 Ibid, [44]. Although Potter LJ held that it was unnecessary and undesirable to decide on the 
relevance or signifi cance of  the doctrine of  AA under Art 4 of  the Convention, he was inclined 
to the view that it may not be a relevant factor and was “satisfi ed that the judge was wrong 
in her approach, which failed to distinguish the potential role of  a choice of  law clause in the 
contract as between Article 3 and Article 4” [49].
35 Credit Lyonnais, supra n 15, 914–16; Caledonia Subsea Ltd, supra n 28, [30]; Samcrete, supra n 17, 
[39].
36 Supra n 15, 914–16.
37 Supra n 17, [39].
38 Gan Insurance Co Ltd and Eagle Star Insurance Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd [1998] CLC 1072, 
1080-82 (Creswell J) – sustained on appeal, but the doctrine of  AA was not considered under 
Art 4 – [1999] CLC 1270, 1278 (Beldam LJ); Dornoch Limited and Others v Mauritius Union Assur-
ance Company Ltd [2005] EWHC 1887 (Comm) [61]–[71] (Aikens J) sustained by the Court of  
Appeal on appeal [2006] EWCA Civ 389 (Tuckey LJ) [40]–[43]; Golden Ocean Group Limited v 
Salgaocar Mining Industries PVT Ltd and Salgaocar [2011] EHWC 56 (Comm) [134]–[136] (Chris-
topher Clarke J); FR Lurssen Werft Gmbh & co KG v Warren E Halle [2009] EWHC 2607 [24], 
[37]–[38] (Simon J) – sustained on appeal – [2010] EWCA Civ 587 [20]–[22] (Sir Paul Ken-
nedy); Pathfi nder Minerals Plc and Other Companies v Veloso and Others [2012] EWHC 2856 (Comm) 
[46].
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to the doctrine by refusing to apply the law of  Egypt under Article 4(5) to dis-
place the presumption in Article 4(2) that was in favour of  Scotland.39
Despite the above objections to the application of  the doctrine of  AA under 
Article 4 of  the Convention, some English courts continued to apply the doc-
trine under Article 4(5).40 The decision of  the CJEU in ICF41 may have been an 
opportunity to provide an insight as to what connecting factors are relevant and 
signifi cant under Article 4(5) of  the Convention and the weight to be placed 
on these factors in displacing the presumption under Article 4(2). However, the 
CJEU in advocating the intermediary approach did not consider the relevance, 
signifi cance or weight to be attached to any factor such as the doctrine of  AA. 
Therefore, the controversy on the relevance and signifi cance of  the doctrine 
of  AA under Article 4 of  the Convention is still ongoing after the decision of  
the CJEU in ICF.
The English High Court in Emeraldian Limited Partnership v Wellmix Shipping 
Limited42 utilised the doctrine of  AA under Article 3 in using the express choice 
of  English law of  a charterparty to govern the contract guaranteeing the obli-
gations in the charterparty. The court in the alternative utilised the doctrine 
of  AA in reaching the same conclusion under Article 4(5) in displacing the 
presumption in Article 4(2) that was in favour of  the application of  Chinese 
law. Similarly, in Gard Marine and Energy Limited v Glacier Reinsurance AG43 Gard 
(claimant/respondent) was a Bermudan insurance company that insured Devon 
Energy, a US company, against property and business interruption risks. Gard 
entered into contracts of  reinsurance with other companies which subscribed to 
a line of  existing London market excess reinsurance policy subject to English 
law. Devon Energy sustained damage to some of  its properties in the Gulf  of  
Mexico. Gard indemnifi ed Devon with regard to its loss under the insurance 
contract. Gard in turn was successfully able to claim (full) reinsurance from 
other companies save for Glacier, a Swiss company (and other companies) that 
disputed payment based on the manner by which Gard calculated the reinsur-
ance claim. Glacier only made part payment to Gard on its reinsurance claim 
39 Ibid, [41]–[44]. He held that though it was “true that there was a relationship between the 
pursuers’ contract and the defenders’ subcontract into which the law of  Egypt was imported. 
However, this is only one of  a number of  circumstances which fall to be considered” [44]. 
Lord President Cullen’s approach is signifi cant because, Professor Lagarde, “Le nouveau droit 
international privé des contrats après l’entrée en vigueur de la Convention de Rome du 19 juin 
1980” (1991) 80 Revue critique de droit international privé 747, despite his support for the doctrine of  
AA, criticised the decision in Bloch v Lima, supra n 16, for using the doctrine of  AA as a decisive 
factor under Art 4(5) of  the Convention. See also Caledonia Subsea Ltd, supra n 28, [30]. 
40 In the case of  Ophthalmic Innovations Limited (UK) v Ophthalmic Innovations International Incorporated 
(USA) [2004] EHWC 2948, the judge referred to the decision of  Samcrete, supra n 17 in his judg-
ment [48], but still utilised the doctrine of  AA under Art 4(5) of  the Convention by applying 
the law that governed the distributorship contract to the contract indemnifying the distributor-
ship [53].
41 Supra n 11. 
42 Emeraldian Limited Partnership v Wellmix Shipping Limited [2010] EWHC 1411 [171].
43 Gard Marine and Energy Limited v Glacier Reinsurance AG [2010] EWCA Civ 1052.
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subject to a reservation of  rights. Gard brought proceedings against Glacier in 
the English High Court on what it regarded as the full reinsurance claim. Gla-
cier had also brought proceedings in Switzerland on the same cause of  action 
against Gard and two other companies, denying liability to Gard, and claiming 
a refund of  the [part payment] reinsurance claim it had already paid to Gard. 
The Swiss Court of  fi rst instance and appeal court both held that the Swiss 
court had no jurisdiction over Gard. The English High Court assumed juris-
diction under Article 6(1) of  the 1988 Lugano Convention in order to avoid a 
risk of  irreconcilable judgment with the other defendants in the Swiss court. 
Glacier appealed the decision, claiming that it should be sued in its domicile 
(Switzerland) under Article 2 of  the Lugano Convention. The Court of  Appeal 
determined what law applied to the excess reinsurance policy as one of  the 
factors in determining on a good arguable case if  the English High Court had 
jurisdiction under Article 6(1). Gard sought the application of  English law, but 
Glacier argued that its line was subject to Swiss law. The Court of  Appeal 
applied the doctrine of  AA under Article 3(1) of  the Convention (in imply-
ing a choice of  law) to the excess reinsurance policy since other parts of  the 
reinsurance policy and the primary insurance policy were governed by English 
law.44 The Court of  Appeal also held that the same results would be reached 
under Article 4(5) of  the Convention in displacing the presumption of  the char-
acteristic performer that was ordinarily in favour of  the law of  Switzerland.45 
The Court of  Appeal in reaching this decision relied on the CJEU’s decision 
in ICF.46 In British Arab Commercial Bank Plc v Bank of  Communications and Commer-
cial Bank of  Syria,47 Blair J specifi cally considered whether the doctrine of  AA 
is precluded “on the basis that such an approach wrongly imports into Article 
4 considerations that are only relevant under Article 3(1)”.48 Blair J answering 
the question in the negative held that
“the tentative view in Samcrete is overtaken by the reasoning in Intercontainer Interfi go. 
The court is not precluded from taking into account any particular type of  factor 
when applying Article 4(5) and is not required to look at the contract in question in 
isolation from other contracts with which it is connected.”
The High Court in reaching this decision also relied on the Court of  Appeal’s 
44 Ibid, [39]–[45], [47]. Other factors which the Court of  Appeal took into consideration were 
that the reinsurance involved a London Market placement (and not a separate Swiss place-
ment), the expiring excess of  loss reinsurance was a London market placement, and the renewal 
was a London market placement.
45 Ibid, [46].
46 Ibid.
47 British Arab Commercial Bank Plc v Bank of  Communications and Commercial Bank of  Syria [2011] 
EWHC 281 (Comm) .
48 Ibid, [32]. 
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decision in Gard Marine.49 In the case of  M Serge Fourez v SA Residence Le Verseuil50 
the appellant, a French national habitually resident in France, was a guarantor 
to an (informal and unwritten) accommodation contract for old people that his 
mother, Jeanne M Gerard (also a French national habitually resident in France), 
entered into with SA La Verseuil de résidence (a nursing home). Mr Fourez’s 
mother was in default of  payment under the accommodation contract to SA 
La Verseuil. SA La Verseuil sued Mr Fourez as guarantor under the contract. 
The Cour de cassation (Supreme Court) in determining the applicable law to 
the contract of  guarantee held that the presumption under Article 4(2) that was 
in favour of  applying French law was displaced in favour of  Belgian law. The 
Supreme Court utilised the doctrine of  AA as a decisive connecting factor by 
holding that as the principal accommodation contract was governed in terms 
of  form and substance by Belgian law – since it was signed in Belgium, and 
the SA La Verseuil, with its central administration in Belgium, was the charac-
teristic performer under the accommodation contract for the said nursing home 
– then Belgium also governed the ancillary contract of  guarantee.51
However, in Golden Ocean Group Limited v Salgaocar Mining Industries PVT Ltd 
and Salgaocar52 Christopher Clarke J, while determining the applicable law for 
the purpose of  determining if  the English High court had jurisdiction based a 
good arguable case to grant leave to order service of  a writ out of  jurisdiction 
on the foreign defendants, applied the doctrine of  AA to a contract of  guar-
antee contained within a charterparty that was expressly governed by English 
law in implying a choice of  law between the parties under Article 3. Chris-
topher Clarke J did not consider the relevance of  the doctrine under Article 
4. There was another issue as to whether the contract between Mr Salgaocar, 
an Indian party who was alleged to have warranted his authority to enter into 
(1) the charterparty contract on behalf  of  a company called Trustworth (a 
Singaporean company), and (2) a guarantee of  SMI (an Indian company) of  
Trustworth’s obligations, was governed by Indian or English law. Christopher 
Clarke J was unable to imply a choice of  law between the parties. In consider-
ing the provisions of  Article 4 of  the Convention, Christopher Clarke J rejected 
the application of  the doctrine of  AA as advanced by counsel to the English 
49 Ibid, [34]. It is respectfully submitted that there is no aspect of  the decision in ICF that recog-
nised the doctrine of  AA as a legitimate, relevant and signifi cant connecting factor under Art 
4 of  the Convention. 
50 Cited in Parisot, supra n 1.
51 Parisot criticises this decision on the basis that a contract of  guarantee is an independent 
contract, from the main contract, and it has its own governing law which can be express or 
implied, or could be determined by the court in the absence of  choice. She holds the view that 
the doctrine of  AA should not apply to this type of  contract. The author disagrees with this 
view. The test should be whether the contracts are intimately connected, irrespective of  whether 
they are dependent or independent of  each other as in the case of  back to back contracts (infra, 
26–35).
52 Supra n 38, [134]– [135].
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party by relying on the reasons earlier on advanced by the Court of  Appeal in 
Samcrete and Credit Lyonnais.53 Tomlinson LJ overturned the aspect of  Clarke J’s 
decision that rejected the application of  the doctrine of  AA under Article 4. 
Tomlinson LJ endorsed the view that the doctrine of  AA applied with regard 
to the contract of  guarantee contained within the charterparty under Article 3 
of  the Convention.54 However, he further held (though this was not considered 
by Clarke J) that the same results could be reached alternatively by the appli-
cation of  Article 4(1) and (5).55 Tomlinson LJ moved further to consider the 
applicable law of  the contract of  warranty of  authority. Although “recognising 
that Article 4 is couched in terms of  performing parties, not legal system”,56 
he respectfully doubted if  the observations of  the Court of  Appeal in Sam-
crete and Credit Lyonnais “were directed towards the special and perhaps unique 
case of  warranty of  authority”.57 He was of  the view that the parties intended 
the contract to be governed by English law under Article 3 of  the Conven-
tion because the principal contract(s) which gave rise to the disputed warranty 
of  authority was also governed by English law.58 He was also of  the view that 
the same results would be reached under Article 4(5) by the application of  the 
doctrine of  AA.59
In the recent case of  Lawlor v Mining and Construction Mobile Crushers Screens 
Ltd,60 the claimant sometime around 1994 was employed by the defendant then 
known as Extec Screens and Crushers Limited (“Extec”), a UK company, to 
carry out the marketing and sale of  screening and crushing machinery on a 
commission basis. There was no formal contract of  employment in writing 
53 Ibid, [134]–[136]. Christopher Clarke J held that India was most closely connected with the 
contract having regard to the fact that Mr Salgaocar and SMI habitually resided in India, and 
Indian law would ordinarily apply to the parties if  it is established that Mr Salgaocar did not 
warrant his authority on behalf  of  SMI to enter into the contract of  guarantee. The author 
agrees with Christopher Clarke J’s approach to the application of  the close connection princi-
ple in this case. 
54 [2012] EWCA Civ 265 [42]–[45].
55 Ibid, [49]. Cf  Cox v Ergo Versicherung AG (formerly Victoria) [2012] EWCA Civ 1001 [12]–[13].
56 Supra n 54, [52].
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid, [53]. The implication of  the decision in Golden Ocean is that there are some special or per-
haps unique contracts where the doctrine of  AA applies under Art 4 of  the Convention such 
as contracts of  guarantee contained within a charterparty expressly governed by English law, 
and an ancillary contract of  warranty of  authority arising in connection with the principal con-
tracts of  charterparty and guarantee governed by English law, but inapplicable to other types 
of  contracts not specifi ed in the Court of  Appeal’s decision. The author (respectfully) does not 
agree with the approach adopted by Tomlinson LJ in applying the doctrine of  AA in this case. 
First, the contracts of  charterparty and guarantee were not intimately connected with the con-
tract of  warranty of  authority. Second, assuming they were intimately connected, the doctrine 
of  AA should not have been used as a decisive connecting factor in applying the principle of  
closest connection in this case because the application of  Indian law had manifestly close ties 
with the contract of  warranty of  authority. See also Okoli and Arishe, supra n *, 527–28 for a 
critique of  this decision. 
60 Lawlor v Mining and Construction Mobile Crushers Screens Ltd [2012] EWHC 1188; supra n 9.
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entered into between the claimant and defendant. It was common ground that 
if  the contract of  employment was in writing it would probably have been gov-
erned by English law, but the parties did not expressly discuss this at the time. 
The claimant carried out his (informal and unwritten) contract of  agency in 
many countries, but his main base and domicile was Spain, where his activi-
ties regarding his relationship with the defendant were largely concentrated. In 
2006, Extec due to its success sought to formalise its contractual arrangements 
with the defendant and other agents by offering formal contracts of  employ-
ment governed by English law to existing agents. The claimant did not sign up 
to the contract of  employment. The position remained the same when Extec 
was acquired by a Swedish company called Sandvik, which later changed its 
name to Sandvik Mining and Construction Mobile Crushers and Screens Lim-
ited. Due to the claimant and defendant being unable to reach an agreement 
on the employment contract, despite protracted negotiations, the defendant ter-
minated the claimant’s contract which was to take effect on 1 June 2009.
The High Court was called to determine whether English or Spanish law 
applied to the contract of  agency. All the contracts (save for the contract of  
employment that had no express choice of  law, and an offi ce leasing agreement 
in Spain that was expressly governed by Spanish law) between the claimant, 
defendant and other parties were expressly governed by English law. The High 
Court held that it could not imply a choice of  law under Article 3 of  the 
Convention despite the existence of  an express choice of  English law in other 
contracts. The court then moved to consider Article 4 of  the Convention and 
did not consider the express choice of  law in all other contracts as signifi cant 
in displacing the presumption in Article 4(2) that was in favour of  Spanish 
law. The court regarded the Spanish connections as much deeper and more 
extensive.61 On appeal, the High Court’s decision was affi rmed.62 The Court 
of  Appeal did not regard the employment and agency contract as coexisting or 
related contracts deserving of  the application of  the doctrine of  AA.63
In summary, if  the contracts are intimately connected, it is the view here 
that the doctrine of  AA may be of  signifi cant weight under Article 4 of  the 
Convention if  it proves insuffi cient to determine the existence of  an implied 
choice of  law under Article 3.64 However, a clarifi cation by the CJEU on the 
relevance and signifi cance of  the doctrine of  AA under Article 4 of  the Con-
vention may eventually prove to be useful to courts of  Member States.
61 Ibid, [58]–[60].
62 Lawlor v Mining and Construction Mobile Crushers Screens Ltd, supra n 9.
63 Ibid, [35].
64 This is especially where the contracts have a very close relationship as is the position under Art 
4 of  Rome I. Another perspective may simply be to regard the application of  the doctrine of  
AA as avoiding the application of  dépeçage in order to apply a single law solely to single complex 
contract(s) such as letters of  credit under Art 4 of  the Convention. See also Parisot, supra n 1, 
1338.
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D. WHY WAS THE DOCTRINE OF ACCESSORY ALLOCATION 
GIVEN SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE UNDER ARTICLE 4(3) 
AND 4(4) OF THE ROME I REGULATION?
Under Article 4(3) and (4) of  Rome I, Recitals 20 and 21 respectively state that 
Member State courts should take into account among other connecting factors 
whether the contract in question has a very close relationship with another 
contract or contracts.65 Therefore, unlike the views expressed by Lord President 
Cullen in Caledonia Subsea66 – who rejected the elevation of  the place of  perfor-
mance or doctrine of  AA as special connecting factors under Article 4 of  the 
Convention because the framers did not indicate that courts of  Member States 
should attach them with such special signifi cance – the elevation of  the doc-
trine of  AA to one of  special signifi cance under Article 4(3) and (4) of  Rome I 
can be justifi ed while utilising the escape clause or determining the principle of  
closest connection. The question is: why did the drafters of  Rome I choose to 
give special signifi cance to the doctrine of  AA in determining the applicability 
of  the escape clause or the principle of  closest connection? No reason is pro-
vided by the framers of  Rome I as to why the doctrine of  AA was given special 
signifi cance. It is important to address the possible reasons why the doctrine of  
AA was given special signifi cance because this aids the proper understanding 
of  the application of  the doctrine.
It is submitted here that there are at least three possible reasons why the 
framers of  Rome I gave the doctrine of  AA special signifi cance. These reasons 
and other alternative views advanced by judges and academics are examined 
below.
1. The Doctrine of  Convenience, Legal Certainty, and the Need 
for Sound Administration of  Justice
The determination of  the applicable law in the absence of  an express or 
implied choice of  law under Article 4 of  Rome I is by no means an easy exer-
cise. The “margin of  discretion”67 placed on courts of  Member States under 
Article 4 of  Rome I in determining the applicable law presents a greater chal-
lenge for the decision-maker faced with the dilemma of  applying potentially 
confl icting laws to contracts that have a very close relationship. In other words, 
the decision-maker faced with the determination of  the applicable law in the 
absence of  an express or implied choice of  law is placed in a diffi cult or incon-
65 It is important to note that the language of  recitals is always couched in words that look for-
ward to what the text of  the Regulation will do. Therefore it is standard practice to use the 
word “should” to indicate that there will be a provision in the Regulation based on the idea in 
the recital. It does not indicate that courts must use the doctrine of  accessory allocation.
66 Supra n 19, [41].
67 Giuliano–Lagarde Report, supra n 10, 21. 
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venient position where he has to apply laws of  different countries (instead of  a 
single law of  a country) that produce potentially confl icting results to contracts 
that have a very close relationship such as back-to-back contracts. Similarly, 
the lawyers in the case will also be faced with the same diffi culty of  advocat-
ing the application of  potentially confl icting laws to contracts that have a very 
close relationship.
The doctrine of  convenience in justifying the utilisation of  AA in Article 
4 is best exemplifi ed by the decision of  Mance J (as he then was) in Bank of  
Baroda,68 where he applied it to a letter of  credit while determining if  the Eng-
lish court had jurisdiction in order to grant leave to order the service of  a writ 
of  jurisdiction on the foreign defendants. In that case, the application of  Article 
4(2) led to the application of  English law between the issuing bank and con-
fi rming bank and as between the confi rming bank and the benefi ciary/seller. It 
was argued before Mance J by counsel for the issuing bank that the relation-
ship between the issuing bank and benefi ciary should be governed by Indian 
law by virtue of  Article 4(2). Mance J in rejecting that submission and apply-
ing the doctrine of  AA emphasised that it would involve “wholly undesirable 
multiplicity of  potentially confl icting laws”69 that could lead to “wholly undesir-
able diffi culties”.70 Mance J stressed the “great inconvenience” that would result 
if  the seller/benefi ciary had to apply English law when suing the confi rming 
bank, but apply Indian law when suing the issuing bank, arising out of  the 
same contractual relationship(s) of  the letter of  credit.71 Mance J thus displaced 
the relationship between the issuing bank and benefi ciary under Article 4(5) in 
favour of  the relationships between the issuing bank and confi rming bank, and 
benefi ciary and confi rming bank, by applying English law to the letter of  credit 
contract of  the parties.72
A second reason for justifying the utilisation of  AA under Article 4 is that 
it reconciles the requirements of  legal certainty and fl exibility.73 In other words, 
the doctrine of  AA ordinarily operates as an exception to the main rule(s) to do 
68 Supra n 17.
69 Ibid, 48. Approved in Marconi Communications, supra n 17, [41].
70 Bank of  Baroda, supra n 17, 48.
71 Ibid, 48–49.
72 Ibid. The Court of  Appeal in Marconi Communications, supra n 17, [55] also endorsed the posi-
tion in Bank of  Baroda, supra n 17, by emphasising that “it is desirable that the same system of  
law should govern the co-existing contracts between (a) the issuing bank and the benefi ciary 
(b) the confi rming bank and the benefi ciary, (c) the issuing bank and confi rming bank” (my 
emphasis). See the common law case of  Vesta v Butcher [1986] 2 Lloyds Rep 179, where the 
court experienced great inconvenience in potentially applying the law of  Norway to a contract 
of  insurance, and the law of  England to the contract of  reinsurance arising out of  the same 
policy issued, because the breach of  warranty under the applicable law of  the former did not 
void the policy issued, but voided the policy under the latter. See also the cases of  Groupama v 
Catatumbo [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 193; Lexington Insurance Co v Wasa International Insurance Co 
Ltd [2009] UKHL 40.
73 See also Recitals 6 and 16 to Rome I.
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justice in individual cases,74 but also leads to legal certainty, since a single law is 
applied to contracts that have a very close relationship in a commercial transac-
tion.75 Similarly, the idea of  reconciling the requirement of  legal certainty and 
fl exibility under Article 4 of  Rome I is another reason why the framers did not 
allow courts of  Member States to split the applicable law to a contract as was 
allowed under the Convention in exceptional circumstances.76
In this regard, Tomlinson LJ rightly77 stated in Golden Ocean that the appli-
cation of  the doctrine of  AA under Article 4 of  the Convention is “conducive 
to the general requirement of  legal certainty in contractual relationships”78 and 
“satisfi es the requirement of  foreseeability of  the law”.79 The idea that the pre-
sumptions create certainty by giving specifi c form and content to the vague 
concept of  close connection and thereby greatly clarifying and simplifying the 
law80 does not always hold true, especially where there is the danger of  apply-
74 In the case of  M Serge Fourez cited in Parisot, supra n 1, the application of  the French law to 
the ancillary guarantee contract (instead of  Belgian law), and Belgian law to the principal 
accommodation contract would have produced an unjust and incongruous result in leading to 
a situation where the guarantor (who had willingly settled previous debts of  his mother under 
the accommodation contract) by taking a technical advantage could avoid liability under the 
main accommodation contract for (the Plaintiff) failing to comply with the law of  France on 
formal requirements for contracts of  guarantee (which was otherwise valid under Belgian law)! 
The application of  a single law (Belgian law) to the said contracts as between the parties in 
this case produced a harmonious and just solution. See also the English common law cases of  
Vesta, supra n 72 and Groupama, supra n 72. For a contrasting view, see Parisot, supra n 1, 1346–
54, who expresses concerns in favour of  applying by virtue of  Art 4(2) the law of  the habitual 
residence of  the guarantor in this case so that he is not stripped of  legal protection he may 
otherwise be entitled to under the mandatory rules of  his habitual residence. The answer to 
this (contrary view) may be for the guarantor to insist on an express choice of  law that suffi -
ciently protects him before agreeing to undertake his obligations.
75 For example, Art 4(1)(h) provides that a contract concluded within a multilateral system which 
brings together or facilitates the bringing together of  multiple third-party buying and selling 
interests in fi nancial instruments shall be governed by a single law. This rule has been justifi ed 
as “necessary for legal certainty for the market participants” in stock exchange transactions. 
See the Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and the Council on the law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I) – Certain fi nancial aspects relating to the appli-
cation of  Article 4 and 5, from services of  the Commission to Committee on Civil Law Matters 
(Rome I) Doc no 741817 of  15 March 2007, 2ff. Similarly, in honouring the aim of  legal cer-
tainty in commercial transactions, Arts 14–17 of  Rome I also expressly favour the application 
of  a single law to contracts that give rise to relationship(s) in contracts of  voluntary assignment, 
legal and contractual subrogation and set-off  in order to interpret the parties’ rights, liabilities 
and obligations predictably and consistently.
76 ICF, supra n 11. See also the Irish case of  ICDL GCC Foundation FZ-LLC and others v European 
Computer Driving Licence Foundation Ltd [2011] IEHC 343 [9.7]–[9.8]; Okoli and Arishe, supra n 
*, 530–31.
77 The view expressed here is subject to the criticism expressed earlier on by some academic(s) on 
the way the doctrine of  AA was applied in using the contracts of  charterparty and guarantee 
to infect another contract of  warranty of  authority that was not closely related. See Okoli and 
Arishe, ibid, 527–28.
78 Supra n 54, [54].
79 Ibid, [55].
80 Giuliano–Lagarde Report, supra n 10, 21.
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ing potentially confl icting laws to contracts that have a very close relationship 
in a commercial transaction. Since the principal aim of  Rome I is to introduce 
certainty that was otherwise lacking in the Convention,81 the doctrine of  AA 
was adopted in Recitals 20 and 21 to achieve this aim. This is because there are 
some contracts that have a very close relationship, and the application of  dif-
ferent laws via the presumption(s) to these contracts may produce uncertainty. 
The doctrine of  AA can easily be invoked in utilising the escape clause or the 
principle of  closest connection to apply a single law. This holds true especially 
in a contract of  letter of  credit that “is not susceptible to such treatment”82 of  
the blanket presumption of  the doctrine of  characteristic performance, because 
it “is the source of  a number of  bilateral contracts arising successively between 
the parties and/or banks involved, each of  which, considered has a separate 
characteristic performance”.83 Thus, in Bank of  Baroda Mance J was concerned 
with the legal uncertainty that would arise if  the seller/benefi ciary had to apply 
different laws as between the issuing and confi rming bank as a result of  the 
application of  the presumption in Article 4(2) to all the contracts arising out of  
the relationships in the letter of  credit. Mance J emphasised that:
“[I]t is of  great importance to both benefi ciaries and banks concerned in the issue 
of  and operation of  international letters of  credit that there should be clarity and 
simplicity in such matters. Article 4(5) provides the answer. The Rome Convention was 
not intended to confuse legal relationships.”84
Thirdly, the application of  the same law to contracts with a very close 
relationship in a commercial transaction, which satisfi es the requirements of  
foreseeability and legal certainty for the parties to a contractual relationship, 
and does not lead to the great inconvenience of  applying a multiplicity of  
potentially confl icting laws, “accords with good sense and sound policy”85 and 
thus “meets the need for sound administration of  justice”.86
81 See Recitals 6 and 16 to Rome I, and the Explanatory memorandum from the Commission, 
accompanying the Proposal for Rome II, COM(2003) 427 fi nal (“Explanatory Memorandum”) 
12.
82 Marconi Communications, supra n 17, [61].
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid, 48. My emphasis. Lord Hamilton in Caledonia Subsea Ltd, supra n 28, [30] adopts the same 
interpretation when he justifi es the application of  the doctrine of  AA in the Bank of  Baroda case 
on the basis that “material confusion would be likely to arise by reason of  different laws apply-
ing to interdependent contracts”. See also Gard Marine, supra n 43, [42]; Vesta v Butcher, supra n 
72; Groupama v Catatumbo, supra n 72; Lexington Insurance Co v Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd, 
supra n 72.
85 Bank of  Baroda, supra n 17, 48.
86 Explanatory Memorandum, supra n 81, 11–12.
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2. Commercial Reasons
One of  the reasons advanced for justifying the application of  the doctrine of  
AA under Article 4 is that it is based on commercial reasons. Some English 
courts and academics adopted commercial reasons as the rationale for apply-
ing the doctrine of  infection under English common law and the Convention. 
Thus, in Bank of  Credit and Commerce Hong Kong Ltd v Sonali87 Cresswell J, having 
spelt out the relationship (among others) between the issuing and confi rming 
bank, issuing bank and benefi ciary, and confi rming bank and benefi ciary, sub-
mitted that under a letter of  credit, “The authorities recognise that there are 
strong commercial reasons why [these] contracts … should be governed by the same 
system of  law.”88 With respect to a contract of  insurance and reinsurance, Hob-
house J in Vesta v Butcher89 held that:
“[W]here a [reinsurance] contract such as the present provides that its terms and 
conditions are to be the same as those of  another [insurance] contract and where 
its clear commercial purpose is to provide corresponding cover to that provided by the 
other contract then unless some other powerful consideration is to intervene the 
conclusion must be that there is an intention that both contracts are to be governed 
by the same law.”90
Dicey and Morris at one time also justifi ed the doctrine of  infection under 
the common law on the basis that the “legal or commercial connection between one 
contract and another may enable the court to say that the parties must be held 
implicitly to have submitted both contracts to the same law”.91
Under Article 4 of  the Convention, the Court of  Appeal in the case of Mar-
coni Communications,92 while applying the doctrine of  AA to a letter of  credit, 
held that
“there was valid reason and commercial logic why, rather than simply applying the pre-
sumption in Article 4(2) of  the Convention, Article 4(5) should be applied between 
Marconi as seller/benefi ciary and Hastin Bank and Panin Bank as issuing and con-
fi rming banks respectively”.93
Also, the Court of  Appeal in Gard Marine, while respectively implying the par-
ties had made a choice of  law and in the alternative utilising the escape clause, 
regarding a contract for excess loss of  reinsurance policy, which had an express 
87 Bank of  Credit and Commerce Hong Kong Ltd v Sonali [1994] CLC 1171.
88 Ibid, 1184. My emphasis.
89 Supra n 72.
90 Ibid, 193.
91 Dicey and Morris, The Confl ict of  Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 11th edn, 1987), 1185. My emphasis. 
See also the cases of  The Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd v Theodore Xenakis [1982] 2 Lloyds Rep 
304 Bingham J (as he then was); Attock Cement Co Ltd v Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade [1989] 1 
WLR 1147, 1158–59; British Arab Bank, supra n 47, [28] (Blair J) for approval of  this statement.
92 Supra n 17.
93 Ibid, [66]. My emphasis.
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choice of  English law in the underlying policy of  insurance and other parts 
of  the reinsurance contract, held that “it would make no commercial sense for 
one part of  the reinsurance contract to be governed by one system of  law and 
another to be governed by a different system of  law”.94
Historically, the insertion of  the doctrine of  AA in Recitals 20 and 21 also 
rests on commercial reasons. It was infl uenced by the strong lobbying of  the 
UK through the Financial Markets Law Committee (FMLC) to refl ect the 
English commercial approach in applying the doctrine of  infection under the 
common law and the Rome Convention.95 Thus, the Ministry of  Justice of  
the UK justifi ed the rule of  AA under Article 4 of  Rome I on the basis that 
“it is of  commercial importance for a single law to be applied to the whole trans-
action rather than having different laws applying to each component part of  
the transaction”.96 Similarly, Professor Fentiman strongly advocates the same 
position when he submits that the accessory allocation principle in Recitals 
20 and 21 “avoids the commercially detrimental result that related contracts 
are governed by different laws. Implicitly commercial effectiveness animates 
the search for the applicable law”.97 Professor Fentiman further states that in 
“determining the law applicable to any given contract the existence of  a related 
contract, connected with a given country, is thus of  commercial considerable 
signifi cance”.98
There is much to commend about justifying the doctrine of  AA in Recitals 
20 and 21 based on its commercial context. This is because it assists the deci-
sion-maker in determining what kind of  contracts have a very close relationship 
and is deserving of  the application of  the doctrine of  AA, while utilising the 
escape clause or the principle of  closest connection. It also explains why Eng-
lish courts under the common law and the Convention consistently do not 
apply the express choice of  law governing an underlying commercial trans-
action to a letter of  credit, demand guarantee or collection contract, on the 
ground that the underlying commercial transaction is separate and not inti-
mately connected with these contracts.99
94 Supra n 43, [41]. My emphasis.
95 Financial Markets Law Committee, “Legal Assessment of  the Conversion of  the Rome Con-
vention to a Community Instrument and the Provisions of  the Proposed Rome I Regulations” 
– European Commission Final Proposal for a Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contrac-
tual Obligations (“Rome I”) (2006) 121(3) 12–14. www.fmlc.org/Documents/April06Issue121.
pdf  (accessed 26 August 2013).
96 Ministry of  Justice, “Rome I – Should the UK Opt In? Consultation Paper CP05/08 of  2 April 
2008, http://www.justice-gov.uk/docs/cp0508.pdf  14. My emphasis.
97 R Fentiman., “The Signifi cance of  Close Connection” in J Ahern and W Binchy (eds), The 
Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual-Obligations: A New International Litigation 
Regime (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 85, 95. See also S Atrill, “Choice of  Law in Contract: The 
Missing Pieces of  the Article 4 Jigsaw” (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 549, 
559–60.
98 Fentiman, supra n 9, 217–18, para 4.115. See also Atrill, supra n 97, 558–59.
99 Minories Finance Ltd v Afribank Nigeria Limited [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 134; Bastone & Firminger Lim-
ited v Nasima (Nigeria) Ltd [1996] CLC 1902, 1907–10; Offshore International SA v Banco Central SA, 
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However, the principal objection to justifying the doctrine of  AA based on 
the commercial context of  the contract fundamentally rests on the basis that 
the text of  Rome I does not support this rationale, despite its historical founda-
tion.100 This approach may also lead to legal uncertainty.101 The principal aim 
of  Rome I is to promote legal certainty in judicial proceedings where there is 
a dispute as to the law applicable.102 Admittedly, locating a contract in its com-
mercial context could also lead to legal certainty for international traders in 
judicial proceedings where the court applies a single law to govern contracts 
that are back to back in order to allocate their legal and commercial risk pre-
dictably and consistently. Also, by applying a single law to very closely related 
contracts, commercial necessity and legal certainty share the similar goals of  
avoiding the need for international traders to spend more money, time and 
resources in recruiting legal experts versed in the application of  different laws 
of  each applicable country, thereby reducing transaction and litigation costs. 
However, in so far as locating a contract in its commercial context threatens the 
goal of  legal certainty, it may be best to reduce the signifi cance of  locating 
a contract in its commercial context. Locating a contract in its commercial 
context in determining the applicable law may be of  considerable value to 
international traders in cross-border transactions, but in adjudication the prin-
cipal goal of  the court is to achieve legal certainty. For example in a case such 
as Vesta v Butcher where the contracts of  insurance and reinsurance were clearly 
back to back, locating the contract in its commercial context favours applying 
the law of  the market (England) where the reinsurance policy was issued, even 
though the primary insurance may have been expressly governed by Norwegian 
law.103 This is the legal uncertainty avoided by the framers of  Rome I because 
supra n 31, 401–02; Power Curber International Ltd, supra n 31, 1233; Attock Cement Co Ltd, supra n 
91, 1158–59; Turkiye Is Bankasi AS v Bank of  China [1993] ILI Rep 132; Wahda Bank, supra n 1, 
409–12; Bank of  Baroda, supra n 17, 47–49; Marconi Communications, supra n 17, [63]; British Arab 
Bank, supra n 47, [30]–[35].
 
100 See also Okoli and Arishe, supra n *, 522; contra Fentiman, supra n 9, 212–16; Atrill, supra n 97, 
565–68. However, the CJEU has utilised the doctrine of  economic criteria in allocating juris-
diction (where the parties have not made a substantive jurisdiction agreement under Article 23 
of  Brussels I) under Article 5(1)(b) of  Brussels I in locating the forum that is proximately con-
nected with a contract of  sale and provision of  services in the cases of  Color Drack Gmbh v Lexx 
International Vetriebs GMBH (Case C-386/05) [2007] ECR I-3699 [40]; Rheder v Air Baltic Corpn 
(C-204/08) [2009] ECR I-6073 [35]; Wood Floor Solutions Andreas Domberger Gmbh v Silva Trade Sa 
(Case C-19/09) [2010] ECR I-2121 [31]. The CJEU in Electrosteel Europe SA v Edel Centro SPA 
(Case C-87/10) [2011] ECR I-4987 [16]–[18] has also taken into account commercial realities 
among international traders by accepting the use of  trade terms and usages such as incoterms 
created by the International Chamber of  Commerce in order to ascertain under the contract 
where the parties indicated the place of  performance to be in allocating jurisdiction under Art 
5(1)(b) of  Brussels I. It remains to be seen if  the CJEU will adopt a commercial approach in 
interpreting Art 4 of  Rome I.
101 See also Okoli and Arishe, supra n *, 522.
102 Recitals 6 and 16 to Rome I.
103 See also Atrill, supra n 97, 562; Fentiman, supra n 9, 202–06. 
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in that situation the court and parties are both placed in a confusing and 
inconvenient position of  advocating and applying the inconsistent provisions 
of  Norwegian and English law on the legal effect of  the term of  the breach 
of  warranty on the policy issued that is back to back in both the contracts of  
insurance and reinsurance, which does not lead to the sound administration 
of  justice. In order to avoid these problems, it may be best to apply the single 
governing law of  one of  the principal contracts (Norwegian law) to both very 
closely related contracts under Article 4.
Another problem with locating the doctrine of  AA in its commercial context 
is that it is obscure.104 In other words, it is not clear what standard the court 
should adopt in locating a contract in its commercial context in applying the 
doctrine of  AA. For example, it is unclear if  the refusal to apply the law gov-
erning the underlying commercial transaction to contracts of  letters of  credit 
and demand guarantees is based on whether or not the parties incorporate soft 
law into their contract published by the International Chamber of  Commerce 
(ICC) such as the provisions of  the Uniform Customs and Practice for Docu-
mentary Credits (“UCP rules”)105 and Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees 
(“URDG rules”).106 Where parties incorporate the URDG rules into their con-
tract which provides that a contract of  guarantee (or performance bond) and 
counter-guarantee are separate and independent commercial transactions, is 
the court mandated to refuse to apply the doctrine of  AA if  it decides these 
contracts are intimately connected?107 These reasons among others expose the 
problem of  uncertainty a decision-maker may face in utilising the doctrine of  
AA if  he pays too much attention to the commercial context of  the contract.108
3. Parties’ Legitimate, Reasonable or Normal Expectations
Tied to the doctrine of  locating the contract in its commercial context is the 
doctrine of  the parties’ legitimate, reasonable or normal expectations. The basis 
of  this latter doctrine is that the parties to a commercial relationship will legiti-
104 Fentiman, ibid, 216, para 4.110, 219, para 4.118; Atrill, ibid, 568–70; Okoli and Arishe, supra 
n *, 522.
105 2007 Revision, ICC Publication no 600. Art 4(a) of  the UCP rule abstracts or severs the under-
lying commercial transaction from the letter of  credit as separate and independent transactions.
106 2010 Revision, ICC Publication no 758. Art 5(a) of  the URDG rule abstracts or severs the 
underlying commercial transaction from the demand guarantee as separate and independent 
transactions.
107 For example, the Court of  Appeal in Wahda Bank, supra n 1, 412 still considered the contract of  
guarantee and the counter-guarantee as intimately connected despite the incorporation of  Art 
2(c) of  the URDG Rules, No 458 Copyright 1992 (which is similar to Art 5(b) of  the URDG 
Rules 2010) into the parties’ contract. Art 2(c) of  the said URDG rules regards the contract of  
guarantee and counter-guarantee as separate and autonomous contracts. The incorporation of  
these rules into the parties’ contract did not bar the court from applying the doctrine of  infec-
tion. 
108 See also Okoli and Arishe, supra n *, 522.
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mately, reasonably or normally expect that a single law applies to their very 
closely related contracts.109 Thus, it is advocated that the application of  Article 
4 is not intended to “disrupt [the] normal expectations”110 of  the parties.
It is possible to advance this argument when determining the real intention 
of  the parties under Article 3. However, even under Article 3 the presumption 
that the parties intend or expect the same law to govern their closely related 
contracts is rebuttable.111
With respect to Article 4, there are some academics who take the view that 
the doctrine of  AA rests on the parties’ legitimate expectations that a single law 
should apply to their closely related contracts.112 In support of  this position, it 
could also be argued by way of  analogy that the Explanatory Memorandum 
of  Rome II justifi es the doctrine of  AA under Article 4(3) of  Rome II because 
it “respects the parties’ legitimate expectations”.113
It is submitted here that advancing the doctrine of  the parties’ legitimate 
expectations as a basis for utilising the doctrine of  AA also creates problems 
in interpreting Article 4(3) of  Rome I. It is unclear what the basis of  inquiry 
is. Are the parties’ legitimate expectations subjective or objective?114 Is it sub-
jective in the sense that the parties expect the same law to govern their very 
closely related contracts? Is it objective in the sense that the court should take 
into account and ascertain the expectations of  international traders from the 
relevant market? In any event, adopting a subjective or objective approach to 
the parties’ legitimate expectations creates problems of  legal uncertainty.
English domestic case-law dealing with applying the law of  different coun-
tries to back-to-back contracts of  insurance and reinsurance exposes this danger 
of  legal uncertainty in adopting the parties’ legitimate expectations as the basis 
for justifying the doctrine of  AA. In the case of  Vesta v Butcher Vesta, a Norwe-
gian insurer, entered into a contract to insure A’s fi sh farm (a contract that was 
held by the court to be governed by Norwegian law). In a bid to allocate its 
risk, Vesta entered into a reinsurance contract (mirrored on similar contractual 
terms with A) with B through London brokers (a contract that was held to be 
109 See also Gard Marine, supra 43, [42].
110 Bank of  Baroda, supra n 17, 48.
111 For example, the parties to a commercial transaction that expressly provide Taiwanese or Mau-
ritanian law to govern their insurance contract cannot legitimately or reasonably expect that 
an English court will apply the same law to their reinsurance contract (if  they do not make 
an express choice of  law) where the contract was negotiated in the London market by London 
brokers and underwriters, and the parties utilise standard policy of  English form of  contract 
such as the Lloyds policy of  insurance. See the Court of  Appeal cases of  Gan Insurance Co Ltd, 
supra n 38, 480; Dornoch Limited, supra n 38, [41]–[43]. 
112 S Dutson, “A Dangerous Proposal: The European Commission’s Attempt to Amend the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations” [2006] Journal of  Business Law 608, 610–14; G Alferez, 
“The Rome I Regulation: Much Ado About Nothing?” (2008) 2 European Legal Forum 61, 70 
para 50; Fentiman, supra n 9, 219, para 4.118; Atrill, supra n 97.
113 See the Explanatory Memorandum, supra n 81, 11–12.
114 Fentiman, supra n 9, 216, para 4.118; Atrill, supra n 97, 568–70.
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governed by English law). There was an express term of  warranty contained 
in the insurance and reinsurance contracts that voided the policy issued if  A 
did not keep a 24-hour watch over the fi sh farm. Norwegian law only recog-
nised voiding the policy in that situation if  the breach of  the warranty caused 
the loss; while under English law it was immaterial if  the breach of  the war-
ranty caused the loss with regard to voiding the policy issued. Due to terrible 
weather conditions, A lost a substantial part of  its fi sh. A did breach the war-
ranty contained in the insurance policy by not keeping a 24-hour watch of  
the fi sh farm, but its failure to keep a 24-hour watch did not cause the loss. 
A successfully claimed indemnity from Vesta under Norwegian law. Vesta, on 
the other hand, claimed reinsurance from B. B refused to pay, contending that 
English law applied in discharging the reinsurer of  its obligations under the 
contract. The House of  Lords held that as a matter of  construction, the par-
ties when entering into the contract expected or anticipated that the term of  
warranty in the insurance contract being back to back with the reinsurance 
introduced the application of  Norwegian law instead of  English law.115 The 
Court of  Appeal in Groupama v Catatumbo, faced with similar material facts to 
Vesta, on similar grounds applied Venezuelan law to a term of  warranty in a 
reinsurance contract to give it a back-to-back effect with the insurance con-
tract.116 However, in Lexington Insurance Co v Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd, 
the House of  Lords, overturning the Court of  Appeal (which had applied Vesta 
and Groupama regarding the parties’ expectations or anticipations on the appli-
cable law), reached a different decision. In this case the insurer, Lexington, a 
Massachusetts company, agreed to insure A and its subsidiary for a period of  
three years (1 July 1977–1 July 1980) in relation to environmental damage to 
property in Massachusetts. Lexington, in turn, obtained reinsurance (mirrored 
on similar contractual terms with A) from two London reinsurers, B and C, 
for the same period of  time in relation to the property insured. A and its sub-
sidiary were exposed in liability to the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency for clean-up costs arising from contamination and pollution to sites 
generated by waste products occurring during a 44-year period from 1942 to 
1986. A sued Lexington (and other insurance companies) in the United States 
in order to claim US$180 million indemnity from Lexington under the insur-
ance. The Supreme Court of  Washington, applying Pennsylvanian law to the 
policy issued under the insurance contract, held that damage within the period 
of  three years was broad enough to cover damage that manifested during the 
said period of  cover. The implication of  the decision was that Lexington was 
115 Vesta v Butcher [1989] AC 852, 892 (Lord Templeman); 901, 911 (Lord Lowry). The court of  
fi rst instance ([1986] 2 Lloyds Rep 179), (Hobhouse J) was unsure whether to treat it as a con-
fl icts-of-law issue, or contractual construction or interpretation of  the parties’ expectations or 
intention.
116 Supra n 72, [20] (Tuckey LJ); [30] (Mance LJ).
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exposed in liability for damage that occurred before and after the three-year 
cover period. Lexington settled with A for the signifi cant sum of  US$103 mil-
lion and claimed indemnity from B and C in English courts. It was accepted 
by the parties that English law applied to the reinsurance contract. The deci-
sion reached by the Supreme Court of  Washington was regarded as strange 
to English eyes by the House of  Lords, as English law would only hold the 
reinsurer liable during the period of  time of  the cover, excluding pre-existing 
or post-existing events. The House of  Lords refused to give the time of  cover 
under the insurance contract as applicable under Pennsylvanian law a back-
to-back effect in the reinsurance contract. The House of  Lords in refusing to 
apply Vesta and Groupama held that when the parties entered into the contract 
they could not have contemplated or expected that the (unidentifi ed) law appli-
cable to the insurance would produce a result that radically differs from the 
legal effect of  the period of  cover under English law.117
Although the House of  Lords in Vesta118 and Lexington Insurance Co119 held that 
it did not approach the issues from a confl ict-of-laws perspective, but simply as 
a matter of  contractual construction, these decisions raise an analogy appro-
priate to challenging the justifi cation of  the application of  the doctrine of  AA 
under Article 4 of  Rome I based on the parties’ legitimate expectations. Can 
it be said, on the one hand, that international traders expect that the law of  
the market should always govern the reinsurance contract even if  a different 
express choice of  law is provided in the insurance contract, because that is 
where the reinsurance policy was issued with the relevant brokers and under-
writers habitually residing and performing their obligations in said market? 
On the other hand, can it be said that international traders expect that as a 
matter of  commercial necessity or effi cacy a single choice of  law governing the 
principal insurance contract could easily infect the terms of  the reinsurance 
contract so that the liability and risk of  the insurer and reinsurer are consist-
ently allocated and given effect to? Which of  these commercial expectations 
of  international traders should the court give effect to in the relevant market?
 In order to reduce the problems of  legal uncertainty, the proponents of  the 
doctrine suggest that the courts, in taking into account the parties’ expectations, 
should aim at reaching a commercially effective and convenient solution.120 
Again, this solution appears to be circular, obscure and is also an invitation 
to courts to go beyond the scope of  Rome I in order to ascertain these objec-
tives.121
117 Supra n 72, [5]–[8] (Lord Philips); [13] (Lord Brown); [42]–[46], [49] (Lord Mance); [55]–[58], 
[107]–[111], [116] (Lord Collins). 
118 Supra n 72, 891 (Lord Templeman); 901 (Lord Lowry). 
119 Supra n 72, [4] (Lord Philips); [15] (Lord Brown); [38]–[49] (Lord Mance); [58], [63] (Lord 
Collins).
120 Fentiman, supra n 9, 216, para 4.118; Atrill, supra n 97, 570–71.
121 See also Okoli and Arishe, supra n *, 522.
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On this basis, justifying the doctrine of  AA based on the parties’ legitimate 
expectations has no place in Article 4 of  Rome I. The principal goal of  legal 
certainty should not be jeopardised or threatened under Rome I while utilising 
the escape clause. This perhaps explains why the doctrine of  parties’ legitimate 
expectations was suggested as a connecting factor to the drafters of  Rome I 
and II in interpreting the escape clause, but was rejected and excluded from its 
fi nal text.122 The context in which Article 4 of  the Rome I is drafted, requiring 
the court to utilise the escape clause in exceptional circumstances in a bid to 
produce legal certainty, is also good reason to hold that justifying the doctrine 
of  AA on the basis of  the parties’ legitimate expectation is not the correct 
approach to adopt both under Article 4 of  Rome I and Rome II.123
E. THE NATURE OF THE INQUIRY
Recitals 20 and 21 simply provide that the court should take account (among 
other connecting factors) of  whether a contract in question has a very close 
relationship with another contract or contracts while utilising the escape clause 
or principle of  closest connection. It does not provide further guidance as to 
how the doctrine of  AA is to be utilised. This section seeks to explore the 
nature of  the inquiry the decision-maker may be faced with in determining 
the signifi cance of  the doctrine of  AA. The fi rst part of  this section exam-
ines the issues that may arise in determining when to apply the doctrine of  
AA under Articles 3 or 4. The second part of  this section is concerned with 
whether the distinction between legal system and geographical connections is 
of  signifi cance when applying the doctrine of  AA under Article 4. The third 
part of  this section is concerned with how the court is to determine what is 
meant by “very close relationship”. Special attention is given to three types of  
contracts with a very close relationship in commercial transactions: (i) insurance 
and reinsurance, (ii) letters of  credit, (iii) and guarantee (or performance bond) 
and counter-guarantee to illuminate on the application of  the doctrine of  AA.
122 The UK lobby group FMLC, supra n 95, 12–14 also wanted the drafters of  Rome I to take 
into account the parties’ expectations in the relevant market when utilising the escape clause. 
The same approach was suggested to the drafters of  Rome II – European Parliament Legis-
lative Resolutions on the Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the 
Council on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II) COM(2006) 83 fi nal 
– 2003/0168 (COD). 
123 A Dickinson, “Rebuttable Assumptions” [2010] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Quarterly 27, 36; 
A Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation: The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008), 341; Okoli and Arishe, supra n *, 536–37. For contrasting opinions, see RJ 
Weintraub, “Rome II: Will it Prevent Forum Shopping and Take Account of  the Consequences 
of  Choice of  Law?” in Ahern and Binchy, supra n 97, 47, 54–55; Fentiman, supra n *, 610. 
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1. Articles 3 or 4 of  the Rome I Regulation?
A major challenge that will confront a decision-maker called upon to apply the 
doctrine of  AA is whether he is to utilise it primarily under Article 3 or Article 
4. Under the Convention, the doctrine of  AA as a guide had primary signifi -
cance under Article 3 especially as it concerned an express choice of  law in a 
related transaction between the same parties. The application of  the doctrine 
under Article 4 of  the Convention was usually utilised as a secondary connect-
ing factor by the English courts. It is uncertain if  the application of  AA takes 
primary or principal signifi cance under Article 4 of  Rome I, or if  its applica-
tion is to be used as a secondary mechanism.124 Although there are no easy 
solutions in this area, some suggestions are made here.
First, the principal difference is that the doctrine of  AA must be applied 
under Article 3 to imply a real choice of  law between the parties. Where the 
court cannot determine the real intention of  the parties from the terms of  the 
contract and circumstances of  the case through the application of  the doctrine 
of  AA, it must move on to Article 4 and utilise the doctrine solely on an objec-
tive basis to determine the applicable law. It should no longer be concerned 
with the intention of  the parties under Article 4.
Secondly, there are cases where the doctrine of  AA may be suffi cient to 
imply a choice of  law under Article 3 and a further consideration of  Article 
4 becomes academic or secondary. For example, an express choice of  law gov-
erning a contract between the same parties may be suffi cient to imply a choice 
of  law in governing the underlying transaction that is proximately connected 
with it, and dispense with the need to consider Article 4.125 However, unlike 
the position under Article 4 of  the Convention, the successful application of  
the doctrine of  AA under Article 3 of  Rome I should ordinarily produce the 
same results under Article 4 because of  the presence of  Recitals 20 and 21.126
Thirdly, where the doctrine of  AA is insuffi cient to imply a choice of  law 
under Article 3, its application may not be decisive under Article 4, especially 
124 Giuliano–Lagarde Report, supra n 10, 17 groups such factors as matters under Art 3, but Recit-
als 20 and 21 to Rome I expressly group it under Art 4. See generally Fentiman, supra n 9, 
200–01, para 4.72; Okoli and Arishe, supra n *, 528.
125 FR Lurssen Werft, supra n 38, [20]; Pablo Star Limited v Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company 
[2009] EWCA Civ 1044, [14]–[17]; Star Reefers Pool Inc v JFC Group Co Ltd [2010] EWHC 3003 
(Comm) [13]–[15] decision reversed on appeal in [2012] EWCA Civ 14 (however, this aspect 
of  the decision was not reversed, so it remains relevant); Alliance Bank JSC v Aquanta Corp [2012] 
EWHC 3281 [54].
126 For example, the High Court in FR Lurssen Werft, supra n 38, [20] applied the same law (English 
Law) that governed the prior vessel construction contract, and subsequent termination agree-
ment to govern the commission agreement that had no express choice of  law under Art 3 of  
the Convention. The court, however, observed that English law would be inapplicable if  it was 
to move further to consider the provisions of  Art 4.
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where the contract(s) sought to be governed does not have a very close relation-
ship with the one that has an express choice of  law.127
Fourthly, the doctrine of  AA simply should not apply under Article 3 where 
there is no express choice of  law in one of  the contracts, and where the con-
tracts are not between the same parties.128 Furthermore, under Article 4, it is 
easier to apply the doctrine of  AA where there is an express choice of  law 
in one or more contracts that have a very close relationship. This is because 
in infecting the other contract(s) the court can easily identify one of  the laws 
the parties have expressly chosen and conveniently apply it to the very closely 
related contract(s). Thus, it is immaterial which of  the contracts that have a 
very close relationship is dominant or greater where an express choice of  law 
is provided in respect of  the other contract(s). The principal or main contract 
that has an express choice of  law can govern the ancillary or subcontract. 
In the same vein, the subcontract or ancillary contract(s) that has an express 
choice of  law can govern the main or principal contract.
The major challenge in the application of  the doctrine of  AA under Arti-
cle 4 is faced by the decision-maker where there is no express choice of  law 
in any of  the contracts being used to infect the other contract(s) with a very 
close relationship. There are at least two possible solutions to this problem. 
The fi rst is to identify the dominant contract or principal contract in the web 
and use its applicable law to govern the other ancillary contract(s) that have a 
very close relationship. The second is to identify and weigh the signifi cant con-
necting factor(s) that tie the contractual relationship between the parties, and 
apply the law of  the country that contains the signifi cant connecting factor(s) 
127 For example, another basis of  justifying the decision in Lawlor’s case, supra n 9, under Arts 3 
and 4 of  the Convention is that the other contracts in question (expressly governed by English 
law) that may have been used to infect the agency contract did not have a very close relation-
ship with the contract of  agency.
128 Lawlor, ibid, [28], [34] and [35]; Giuliano–Lagarde Report, supra n 10, 17; Fentiman, supra n 9, 
201, para 4.72; Corneloup, supra n 1, 307, para 24; Parisot, supra n 1, 1343. The reason is that 
the requirement that the implied choice of  law of  the parties being demonstrated with reason-
able certainty is a signifi cant requirement under Art 3. First, the absence of  an express choice of  
law in the contract being used to govern another closely related contract under Article 3 leaves 
the court in considerable doubt as to whether the parties impliedly made a choice of  law to 
govern the contract in question. Secondly, where the contract is not between the same parties 
there is also considerable doubt as to whether the parties (including those not privy to the con-
tract) made an implied choice of  law as regards the contract that is sought to be infected. In 
other words, it cannot be said with reasonable certainty that party A had the real intention of  
applying the law of  a related contract(s) (A was never privy to) between B and C to the con-
tract A has solely with B. On this basis, the author respectfully regards the decision reached 
by Tomlinson LJ in Golden Ocean, supra n 54, [51]–[55] that he could imply a choice of  law 
under Art 3 by importing the law (English law) governing both the contracts of  charterparty 
and guarantee to the contract of  warranty of  authority (which Golden Ocean was not privy 
to) that was between Mr Salgaocar, Trustworth and SMI as wrongly decided. Remarkably, (all) 
the parties at the High Court and Court of  Appeal did not advocate the application of  Art 3 
to the contract of  warranty of  authority. The parties’ arguments were confi ned to the applica-
tion of  Art 4.
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(that tie the parties’ contractual relationship) to all the contracts that have a 
close relationship.
Each of  these solutions has its associated problems. As regards the fi rst solu-
tion, identifying the principal contract among the web of  other contracts is 
by no means an easy exercise especially where there are more than two very 
closely related contracts involved.129 Secondly, there is the danger that a court 
may read too much into the application of  the principal contract in govern-
ing another contract that actually has no close relationship with the principal 
contract.130 As regards the second solution, weighing and identifying the sig-
nifi cant connecting factor(s) that tie all the contracts together places too much 
discretion in the hands of  the decision-maker and could lead to tailoring the 
applicable law to suit the forum. For example, English judges under Article 
4 of  the Convention were infl uenced by common law decisions131 in unduly 
elevating the place of  performance as a signifi cant connecting factor in deter-
mining the law applicable to a web of  closely related contracts under a letter 
of  credit, which always led to the application of  English law.132
This is an area where the guidance of  the CJEU would be welcome. The 
author is inclined to the view that where there are two contracts with a very 
close relationship, it is easier to apply the dominant or principal contract in 
governing the other contract, but where there are more than two contracts 
with a very close relationship, it is easier to weigh the signifi cance of  the con-
necting factors in determining the law of  the country that should apply to the 
web of  contracts.
2. Legal System or Country
Article 4(3) speaks of  the court displacing the main rule in favour of  another 
country that has a manifestly closer connection. Article 4(4), however, speaks 
of  applying the law of  the country that has the closest connection where the 
rules are inapplicable. This raises the question whether the distinction created 
between legal system and geographical connections as was done under the 
129 See also Plender and Wilderspin, supra n 9, 200, para 7-083.
130 With respect, the decision in Golden Ocean, supra n 54, [52]–[53] is open to objection on the basis 
that Tomlinson LJ appears to have been excessively concerned with what he regarded as the 
principal contract(s) of  charterparty and guarantee in infecting another contract of  warranty 
of  authority. The contract of  warranty of  authority was primarily concerned with whether Mr 
Salgaocar, was alleged to have warranted his authority to enter into (1) the charterparty con-
tract on behalf  of  Trustworth, and (2) a guarantee of  SMI of  Trustworth’s obligations. The 
said principal contracts of  charterparty and guarantee, and the other contract of  warranty of  
authority were separate contracts and not intimately connected. See also Okoli and Arishe, 
supra n *, 527–28.
131 Offshore International SA, supra n 31, 401–02; Power Curber International Ltd, supra n 31, 1240–42; 
European Asian Bank AG v Punjab, supra n 31, 656–57.
132 Bank of  Baroda, supra n 17, 47–49; Marconi Communications, supra n 17, [41]–[43]. See also Habib 
Bank Ltd, supra n 17, [43]–[44].
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Convention133 and common law134 in determining the applicable law is of  sig-
nifi cance under Article 4 of  Rome I.135 This issue is of  importance because the 
doctrine of  AA primarily concerns itself  with the legal system that applies to 
the contract, rather than the country itself.136
The author is of  the view that if  the doctrine of  AA is to be of  consider-
able signifi cance under Article 4 of  Rome I, then creating such distinctions 
between geography and legal systems will subvert the intention of  the framers 
of  Rome I as can be found in Recitals 20 and 21. In other words, the pres-
ence of  Recitals 20 and 21 implies that courts should not be bothered with 
distinctions between country and legal system as was done by some courts and 
academics under the Convention and common law.
3. Very Close Relationship
Recitals 20 and 21 require that the contracts have a very close relationship 
in applying the doctrine of  AA. There is, however, no guidance as to what is 
meant by a “very close relationship”. It is submitted that this may create uncer-
tainty among courts of  Member States, where different standards are adopted 
in determining which contracts have a very close relationship. However, the 
rule appears suitable as it does not fetter the discretion of  the decision-maker 
in determining which contract(s) have a very close relationship with another 
contract(s) in the circumstances of  the case. It is a rule that must be left fl ex-
ible and from which case-law will create stability.
It has been submitted elsewhere that in determining whether the contracts 
have a very close relationship under Article 4, the court should generally be 
concerned with substantive connections between the contracts and not succeed-
ing contracts or string sales that arise from a previous course of  dealing because 
they are independent or not depending on another.137 The author respectfully 
133 Credit Lyonias, supra n 15, 914–16; Samcrete, supra n 17, [39]; Golden Ocean, supra n 54, [52].
134 Bonython v Australia [1951] AC 201, 221–23; Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd v James Miller 
and Partners Ltd [1970] 2 AC 583, 603, 606.
135 See also Plender and Wilderspin, supra n 9, 195; JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North 
and Fawcett, Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 14th edn, 2008), 710; Beaumont 
and McEleavy, supra n 9, 462, 10.129; Collins et al, supra n 9, 1821, para 32-073. 
136 Credit Lyonnais, supra n 15, 914–16; Samcrete, supra n 17, [39].
137 ZS Tang , “Law Applicable in the Absence of  Choice: The New Article 4 of  the Rome I Reg-
ulation” (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 785, 798–99. This view is supported by the opinion of  
Lord Hamilton in Caledonia Subsea Ltd, supra n 28, [40] that justifi es the application of  the doc-
trine of  AA solely to interdependent contracts such as letters of  credit. Similarly, Parisot, supra 
n 1, 1338–39 even takes the view that the doctrine of  AA should only apply to single complex 
contract(s) with multiple rights, liabilities and obligations, which may be compared to the refusal 
to apply dépeçage. The advantage of  this approach is that the doctrine of  AA should be utilised 
as an exceptional remedy to avoid the rules being displaced too easily and unjustifi ably such 
as the English Court of  Appeal’s decision in Golden Ocean, supra n 54, discussed above. How-
ever, taking a narrow view of  what contracts with a “very close relationship” means greatly 
limits the signifi cance of  the application of  the doctrine AA. Contracts could be independent 
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disagrees with this view to the extent that it appears to take a narrow view of  
contracts with a very close relationship in applying the doctrine of  AA. This 
is because in considering whether or not to apply the escape clause or princi-
ple of  closest connection, the court “is not precluded from taking into account 
any type of  connecting factor”138 nor is it “limited by any categorisation of  the 
relevant factors”139 such as the prior and subsequent conduct of  the parties 
in entering into contracts that have a very close relationship in a commercial 
transaction.140
It is suggested that the test in determining whether the contracts have a 
very close relationship is to examine the object, terms of  the contract and sur-
rounding circumstances of  the case objectively. Where the court fi nds that the 
contracts are closely linked, coexist or are intimately connected either because 
the contracts are contained within the same legal document or share the same 
purpose in the commercial transaction, it should apply the doctrine of  AA. 
Examples of  such contracts are joint venture and joint operating agreements 
especially in oil and gas transactions, charterparty and guarantee contracts con-
tained within the same legal instrument,141 bills of  lading and charterparty,142 
distributorships and the contracts indemnifying the obligations therein,143 lease 
contracts and the contracts guaranteeing the obligations therein,144 commission 
contracts, vessel construction contracts and termination contracts that share 
the same purpose,145 contracts of  indemnity and guarantee aimed at securing 
of  each other (eg insurance and reinsurance, and performance bond and counter guarantee), 
but intimately connected by (contractual) terms mirroring the rights, obligations and liabilities of  
the parties under the contracts, and thus deserving of  the application of  AA.
 
138 British Arab Bank, supra n 47, [34].
139 Apple Corps Ltd v Apple Computers Inc [2004] EWHC 768 (Ch) [59]
140 Giuliano–Lagarde Report, supra n 10, 21. See also FR Lurssen Werft Gmbh, supra n 38, [37]–
[38]. It is submitted here that the position under the common law as decided by the House 
of  Lords in Whitworth Street Estates, supra n 134, 603, 616 that precluded subsequent conduct 
of  the parties as a connecting factor in determining the country or legal system with the clos-
est connection should have no bearing on the interpretation of  Art 4 of  the Convention and 
Rome I. See also Art 18 of  the Convention. Cf  CGJ Morse, “The EEC Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations” (1982) 2 Yearbook of  European Law 107, 125 n 90; 
Peter Stone, EU Private International Law: Harmonization of  Laws (Edward Elgar, 2006); Plender 
and Wilderspin, supra n 9, 195, para 7-072; Collins et al, supra n 9, 1795–96, para 32-05.
141 The High Court’s decision in Star Reefers Pool Inc, supra n 125, [13]–[15]; Golden Ocean, supra n 
54, [42]–[45], [49]. Compare Arts 15 and 16 of  Rome I.
142 The Njegos, supra n 1; Pacifi c Molasses and United Trading Co Ltd v Entre Rios Compania Naveria SA 
(“The San Nicolas”) [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 8; Navig 8 Pte Ltd v Al-Riyadh Co for Vegetable Oil Industry 
[2013] EWHC 328 (Comm).
143 Ophthalmic Innovations Limited (UK), supra n 40, [53].
144 Sté Total Afrique v Serrure, supra n 1; Lionbrook Property Partnership Number 1 Limited v La Maille Auboise 
SAS, Judgment of  22 September 2009 in Beaumont and McEleavy, supra n 9, 454, para 10.96; 
M Serge Fourez v SA Residence Le Verseuil, supra n 1. Compare it with Arts 15 and 16 of  Rome I. 
145 FR Lurssen Werft, supra n 38, [20].
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the same contract,146 insurance and reinsurance contracts147 guarantees (or per-
formance bonds) and counter-guarantees,148 collection contracts,149 and letters 
of  credit.150 The contracts specifi ed here are in no way exhaustive. Contracts 
of  insurance and reinsurance contracts, guarantees and counter-guarantees, 
and letters of  credit are given special consideration hereinafter. These types of  
contracts are singled out for special attention because they are intimately con-
nected with each other, and the obligations carried out by the parties to the 
contract are intended to be back to back the same as their liability. In other 
words, these back-to-back contracts usually contain the terms of  the obligation 
and liability of  the parties to the contract that materially mirror each other. 
(a) Reinsurance and Insurance Contracts
Contracts of  reinsurance and insurance are contracts with a very close rela-
tionship. This is because a reinsurance contract is usually back to back with 
the primary insurance contract and the terms and nature of  cover in both 
contracts are in most respects the same.151 Determining the applicable law that 
applies to the contract of  reinsurance could be easy in at least two cases. First, 
the reinsurance contract could simply incorporate all the terms of  the primary 
insurance including the applicable law.152 Thus, the court called upon to inter-
pret the reinsurance contract simply applies the law of  the insurance contract 
146 Alliance Bank JSC, supra n 125, [54].
147 Vesta v Butcher, supra n 72, 193, (Hobhouse J); Groupama, supra n 72, [20] (Tuckey LJ); [30] 
(Mance LJ); Amin Rasheed Shipping Corpn v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50; Pine Top Insur-
ance Co Ltd v Unione Italiana Anglo Saxon Reinsurance Co Ltd [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 476; Tiernan v 
The Magen Insurance Co Ltd [2000] ILPr 517; ACE v Zurich Insurance Company and Zurich American 
Insurance Company [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 423; Gan Insurance Co Ltd, supra n 38; Dornoch Limited, 
supra n 38; Lexington Insurance Co, supra n 72; Stonebridge Underwriting Ltd v Ontario Municipal Insur-
ance Exchange [2010] EWHC 2279 (Comm) [22]–[24]; Faraday Reinsurance Co Ltd v Howden North 
America Inc [2011] EWHC 2837 (Comm) [61]–[63], this decision was not disturbed on appeal 
[2012] EWCA Civ 980); Gard Marine, supra n 43, [39]–[46].
148 British Arab Bank, supra n 47, [30]–[35].
149 Minories Finance Ltd v Afribank Nigeria Limited, supra n 99; Bastone & Firminger Limited, supra n 99.
150 Bank of  Baroda, supra n 17, 47–49; Marconi Communications, supra n 17, [41]–[43].
151 Vesta v Butcher, supra n 72, 852, 895 (Lord Griffi ths); Lexington Insurance Co, supra n 72, [55]. 
See also Trgyg Baltica International (UK) Ltd v Boston Compania de Seguros SA [2004] EWHC 1186 
(Comm). However, Rome I provides a separate choice of  law rule in Art 7 of  Rome I to govern 
contracts of  insurance as distinct from contracts of  reinsurance that respectively falls into the 
general choice of  law and applicable law rules in Arts 3 and 4 of  Rome I.
152 Where only the terms and conditions of  the policy of  insurance are incorporated or mir-
rored into the contract of  reinsurance without an unequivocal reference to the applicable law, 
the court both under the Convention and Rome I should not apply the law of  the contract 
of  insurance to the reinsurance contract as an express choice of  law: Gan Insurance Co Ltd and 
Eagle Star Insurance Ltd, supra n 38, 480; Dornoch Limited, supra n 38, [40]–[43]. This is unlike the 
position at common law where Lord Denning in San Nicolas, supra n 142, regarded the express 
choice of  law of  a bill of  lading as simply incorporated into the charterparty (that had no 
express choice of  law) because the contracts were intimately connected and the terms of  both 
contracts mirrored each other. 
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to the reinsurance contract as an express choice of  law. Secondly, a court can 
imply a choice of  English law through the doctrine of  AA to the contract of  
reinsurance that contains no express choice of  law, where the parties negoti-
ate a contract of  insurance (governed expressly or impliedly by English law) 
and reinsurance in England, in the London Market, with London brokers and 
underwriters, and with well-known English form and terms provided in the 
contract such as Lloyd’s policy of  insurance.153 The same results could easily 
be reached in the alternative under Article 4.154
The major problem arises where the parties provide a choice of  law that is 
not English in the insurance contract, and do not provide for an express choice 
of  law in the reinsurance contract that is negotiated in England, in the London 
Market, with London brokers and underwriters, and with well-known English 
form and terms provided in the contract such as Lloyd’s policy of  insurance. 
It is uncertain how the court is to approach the application of  the doctrine of  
AA under Articles 3 and 4 of  Rome I.
Under the common law and the Convention, English courts attached impor-
tance to both factors of  AA and the use of  a standard English form of  policy 
insurance in a London Market, but gave special preference to the latter factor(s) 
in implying a choice of  English law. In this respect, the English courts’ position 
is that “there remains something surprising and improbable about the conclu-
sion that Lloyd’s slip and Lloyd’s policy are governed by anything other than 
English law”.155 Thus, the English Court of  Appeal in the case of  Gan Insurance 
Co Ltd and Eagle Star Insurance Ltd,156 in applying Article 3 of  the Convention to 
a contract of  reinsurance negotiated in the London market with London bro-
kers and underwriters in which the primary insurance was expressly governed 
by Taiwanese law, held that it was improbable that a contract of  reinsurance 
“made in London between London underwriters and brokers [where] their 
agreement is based on the well known duty of  disclosure and the right of  the 
insurer to avoid a policy for misrepresentation … would introduce any term 
of  Taiwanese law”.157 However, in another decision in Dornoch Limited and Others 
153 Stonebridge Underwriting, supra n 147, [22]–[24]; Gard Marine, supra n 43, [39]–[47]. It is important 
to note that English law has been selected here as an example because of  England’s well-known 
reputation and expertise in the insurance and reinsurance business spanning over a period of  
three centuries. Thus, “English law” could be used interchangeably with the “law of  the market 
where the policy was issued” which may be the law of  any other country as the case may be.
154 Stonebridge Underwriting, supra n 147, [24]; Gard Marine, supra n 43, [46].
155 Vesta v Butcher, supra n 72, 193 (Hobhouse J); See also Citadel Insurance Co v Atlantic Union Insurance 
Co SA [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 543; Amin Rasheed Shipping Corpn v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50; 
Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd, supra n 147; Tiernan, supra n 147; ACE, supra n 147; Stone Bridge Under-
writing Ltd, supra n 147, [22]–[24]; Faraday Insurance Co. Ltd, supra n 147, [61]–[63] (this decision 
was not disturbed on appeal [2012] EWCA Civ 980); Gard Marine, supra n 43, [39]–[46]. 
156 Supra n 38.
157 Ibid, 1278. Beldam LJ did not consider the application of  the doctrine of  AA under Art 4 of  
the Convention. The lower court judge, Creswell J, supra n 38, 1080–82 also held in favour 
Vol. 9 No. 3 Journal of  Private International Law 483
v Mauritius Union Assurance Company Ltd and Another158 a different approach was 
adopted while determining if  the court had jurisdiction on a good arguable 
case to grant leave to order service of  a writ out of  jurisdiction on the foreign 
defendants. The primary insurance policy was expressly subject to Mauritius 
law and jurisdiction. The reinsurance policy was also expressly governed by 
Mauritius law, but the excess reinsurance policy which was negotiated in the 
London market with a standard form of  English contract was not governed by 
a choice of  law. Aikens J, in considering whether to apply English law or Mau-
ritius law under Article 3 of  the Rome Convention, considered the application 
of  the doctrine of  AA having regard to the very close relationship between 
the contract of  the primary insurance policy and reinsurance policy expressly 
governed by Mauritius law, and considered its application to the excess rein-
surance policy, which was, however, negotiated in the London market with a 
standard form of  English contract, but was not governed by an express choice 
of  law.159 Aikens J concluded that there was a stalemate in implying a choice 
of  law under Article 3 in favour of  English law or Mauritius law.160 Aikens J 
moved on to consider the applicable law under Article 4 and held that under 
Article 4(2) the characteristic performer was the English party with its central 
administration in England, and on that basis simply applied English law with-
out any (further) consideration of  the doctrine of  AA under Article 4(5).161 On 
appeal, this aspect of  Aiken J’s decision was sustained and approved by the 
Court of  Appeal.162
 Should a case similar to Dornoch Limited Gan Insurance Co and Gan Insurance Co 
present itself  under Rome I, it is submitted that the same stalemate expressed 
by Aikens J in Dornoch in refusing to imply a choice of  law between the par-
ties in respect of  the law of  England or Mauritius also applies under Article 3 
of  Rome I. However, the court, being duty bound to consider and give special 
weight to the application of  the doctrine of  AA by virtue of  Recital 20 with 
regard to contracts that have a very close relationship, should apply the law of  
Mauritius or Taiwan (as the case may be) to the contract of  reinsurance under 
Article 4(3) of  Rome I to achieve the principal goals of  legal certainty, con-
venience and sound administration of  justice. In other words, English courts in 
this situation should jettison the narrow-minded position that a policy of  rein-
surance issued in the London Market retains “a stubbornly English [legal or 
commercial] signifi cance”.163 This view is also of  considerable practical impor-
of  the application of  English law under Art 4(2) of  the Convention, but did not consider the 
application of  the doctrine of  AA under Art 4(5).
 
158 Supra n 38.
159 Ibid, [61]–[68].
160 Ibid, [68].
161 Ibid, [70].
162 [2006] EWCA Civ 389 (Tuckey LJ) [40]–[43].
163 The author borrows the phrase of  Mance LJ (as he then was) in Groupama, supra n 72, [30] used 
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tance as it also ensures that the risks of  international traders’ in back-to-back 
contracts are allocated predictably and consistently. Thus, in the cases of  Vesta 
and Groupama discussed above, the implication of  applying English law to the 
term of  breach of  warranty under the reinsurance contract instead of  the law 
of  the principal insurance contract leads to the absurd and unjust result where 
the reinsurer is able to take a technical advantage over the insurer by avoiding 
his liability to pay the insurer who has already paid the insured in a contract of  
insurance which is clearly back to back with the contract of  reinsurance in its 
terms. Of  particular signifi cance is that the solution worked out by the House 
of  Lords in Vesta in treating the issue as simply a matter of  construction of  
the terms of  a back-to-back insurance and reinsurance contract does not apply 
under the Convention and Rome I, because the application of  section 10 of  
the Convention and section 12 of  Rome I renders it a private international law 
matter in recognising the applicable law as one that interprets the terms of  the 
contract. Resorting to splitting the applicable law as a last resort is not recog-
nised under Article 4 of  Rome I in order to apply the law of  the insurance to 
the term of  the warranty in the contract of  reinsurance. Moreover, it is highly 
doubtful even under the Convention if  the court in such a situation can resort 
to splitting the applicable law under Article 4.164 Applying Article 4(3) through 
Recital 20 appears to be the best solution.
Admittedly, this solution does not always serve the needs of  justice as was 
seen in Lexington case where the reinsurers were potentially exposed to a huge 
liability by the application of  Pennsylvanian law in the contract of  insurance to 
the term of  the reinsurance contract concerning the legal effect of  the period 
of  cover, which the reinsurers may never have expected or anticipated, and for 
which they could not protect themselves against. Another challenge with this 
solution, as was demonstrated in Lexington, is where the fi rst court identifi es a 
choice of  law between the parties in the absence of  an express choice of  law to 
the principal (insurance) contract that the second court does not agree with by 
the application of  its own (second court) PIL rules in a bid to infect the ancil-
lary contract (reinsurance). For example, in Lexington Lord Mance and Lord 
Collins both held that by English domestic confl ict-of-law rules, Massachusetts 
law should be appliead to the insurance policy (based on the connecting fac-
tors of  the place where the insurer carried on his business or head offi ce is 
situated, and the place where the policy was issued with relevant brokers and 
underwriters performing their obligations there) instead of  Pennsylvanian law 
in relation to giving effect to the term of  the warranty in a back-to-back contract of  insurance 
and reinsurance. In the House of  Lords, Lord Mance in Lexington, supra n 72, [50], and Lord 
Collins [73] approved the phrase.
 
164 Splitting the applicable law (also known as dépeçage) is to be utilised by a court on exceptional 
grounds, especially where the contract is independent and can be severed from the rest of  the 
other contracts. C-133/08 Intercontainer Interfrigo SC (“ICF”) v Balkenende Oosthuizen, supra n 11, 
[42], [43], [45], [46], [48] and [49].
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as identifi ed by the trial US Judge and the US Supreme Court which applied 
the domestic confl ict-of-law rules of  the State of  Washington (based on the 
connecting factor(s) of  the place of  incorporation, and headquarters (or cen-
tral administration) of  the assured’s company).165 At least two positions may 
arise. First, in the case of  courts within Brussels I and Rome I, the doctrine of  
mutual trust, confi dence and practical effectiveness of  the Regulations should 
enable the second court to accept the choice of  law identifi ed by the fi rst court 
as infecting the ancillary contract so as to allocate the parties obligations, liabili-
ties and risk predictably and consistently.166 Second, where the fi rst court (as in 
Lexington) is not a party to Brussels I and Rome I, it may be diffi cult to advocate 
the use of  a foreign PIL rule to infect the ancillary contract. To do so may be 
to import different considerations used in a foreign PIL rule to infect another 
very closely related contract.167
 Again, the answer to these problems lies in international traders 
making a single express choice of  law for the contracts of  insurance and rein-
surance. In the alternative, Lord Mance in Lexington’s case rightly suggests that 
the parties can make an express choice of  law that clearly applies to a given 
term in the reinsurance contract to give the insurance and reinsurance con-
tracts a full back-to-back effect.168 Fortunately, this position is also recognised 
under both Article 3 of  the Convention and Rome I, which allows the parties 
to split the applicable law to their contract(s) in so far as it does not produce 
logically inconsistent results.
(b) Letters of  Credit
This section seeks to explore two crucial issues regarding the application of  
the doctrine of  AA with regard to letters of  credit. The fi rst concerns the con-
tracts that have a very close relationship under a letter of  credit. The second 
concerns the proper approach to determining the doctrine of  AA in a letter 
of  credit.
165 Supra n 72, [46] (Lord Mance), [91]–[93], (Lord Collins). 
166 See the CJEU’s decisions in Van Uden Maritime BV (t/a Van Uden Africa Line) v Kommanditgesellschaft 
in Firma Deco-Line (C-391/95) [1998] ECR I-7091; Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl (C-116/02) 
[2003] ECR I-14693; Turner v Grovit (Case C-159/02) [2004] ECR I-3565, [24]–[31]; Allianz 
SpA (formerly Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA) v West Tankers Inc (C-185/07) [2009] ECR I-663, 
[27]–[34]. Admittedly, this solution is easier where proceedings on the determination of  the 
applicable law to the principal contract have been decided already in one of  the Member State 
courts. Where proceedings are running concurrently by each court properly exercising its juris-
dictional competence under Brussels I to determine the law that applies to very closely related 
contracts, unless a consolidation of  proceedings is achieved, it is likely that confl icting results 
may be reached on the parties’ obligations, risk and liability with regard to very closely related 
contracts. See also Corneloup, supra n 1.
167 See also Corneloup, supra n 1, para 37. 
168 Supra n 72, [51].
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On the fi rst issue, leaving aside the contract of  sale, a letter of  credit is usu-
ally composed of  about four component contracts. First, there is the contract 
between the issuing bank and the buyer. Second, there is the contract between 
the issuing bank and confi rming bank. Third, there is a contract between the 
confi rming bank/advising bank and seller/benefi ciary. Fourth, there is a con-
tract between the issuing/reimbursing bank and seller/benefi ciary. English 
courts for commercial reasons, both under the common law and the Conven-
tion, have consistently considered the second, third and fourth contracts as 
having a very close relationship because a letter of  credit contract is primarily 
concerned with the security of  the seller’s payment.169 For the same reasons, 
the English courts have been consistent under the common law and the Con-
vention in refusing to apply (even) the express choice of  law of  the underlying 
commercial transaction between the buyer and seller to govern the letter of  
credit, because the underlying contract is independent and autonomous from 
the letter of  credit.170 It is uncertain if  this rule merely restates the common law 
position or if  it was infl uenced by the UCP rules.171 It is, however, submitted 
that the rule is also conducive to legal certainty in commercial transactions.172
It is uncertain if  the English position will be accepted by other Member 
State courts called upon to apply the doctrine of  AA to a letter of  credit. For 
example, Professor Struycken in his early publication suggested that the govern-
ing law of  the contract between the seller/benefi ciary and issuing bank is the 
dominant contract that should govern the other contracts because “the benefi -
ciary’s acceptance of  that contract is the fi rst and most important step in the 
whole transaction”.173 In the alternative, he argues that the law governing the 
underlying contract of  sale which gives rise to the letter of  credit could also 
be the dominant contract, which is capable of  governing the letter of  credit 
depending on the level of  abstraction.174 A clarifi cation by the CJEU in this 
area would be welcomed.
169 Bank of  Credit, supra n 87, 1184; Bank of  Baroda, supra n 17, 47–49; Marconi Communications, supra 
n 17, [62]. 
170 European Asian Bank, supra n 31, 368; Offshore International SA,supra n 31, 401–03; Power Curber 
International Ltd, supra n 31, 1240–42; Bank of  Credit, supra n 87, 1184; Bank of  Baroda, supra n 
17, 47–49; Marconi Communications, supra n 17, [62]; Habib Bank Ltd, supra n 17, [43]–[44].
171 Power Curber International Ltd, supra n 31, 1239 (Lord Denning); Cf Attock Cement Co Ltd, supra n 
91; Edward Owen Engineering Limited v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] QB 159; Marconi Com-
munications, supra n 17, [63]. 
172 “[A] seller should not be kept out of  his money by litigation against him at the suit of  the 
buyer. In the absence of  fraud the seller is entitled to be paid on presentation of  genuine docu-
ments”: Griffi ths LJ in Power Curber International, supra n 31, 1243. See also Hamzeh Malas & Sons 
v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 2 QB 127; Edward Owen Engineering Ltd, supra n 171, 169. 
173 Supra n 28, 23. See also Van Der Plas and Struycken, supra n 28, 273. Similarly, Jayme, supra 
n 1, also supports the identifi cation of  the dominant contract in banking transactions such as 
letters of  credit in utilising the doctrine of  AA.
174 Supra n 28, 23, fn 30. The author is, however, inclined to support the application of  the English 
position under Art 4 of  Rome I. It cannot be authoritatively stated either in law or commerce 
that the contracts of  sale and letters of  credit have a very close relationship for the purposes 
of  Recital 20 or 21.
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On the second issue, the application by English courts of  the doctrine of  
AA under Article 4 of  the Convention was approached with a common law 
fl avour. In other words, English courts simply applied their old PIL rules to let-
ters of  credit. Thus, in Bank of  Baroda Mance J determined the characteristic 
performer between the issuing bank and the confi rming bank under Article 4(2) 
as English law by placing reliance on a common law decision.175 Mance J was 
of  the view that the party (confi rming/advising bank) charged with the respon-
sibility of  adding its confi rmation to make payment against the presentation of  
compliant documents by the seller is the characteristic performer, and the duty 
of  reimbursement by the issuing bank was merely a consequential obligation.176 
Mance J further considered the relationship between the confi rming bank and 
seller and held that it was governed by English law, and applied these con-
tracts that were governed by English law to govern the contract between the 
issuing bank and the seller that will ordinarily have been governed by Indian 
law if  Article 4(2) was applied as well. Similarly, in Marconi Communications the 
case was concerned with whether the court had jurisdiction based a good argu-
able case to grant leave to order service of  a writ out of  jurisdiction on the 
foreign defendants. The seller/benefi ciary claimed against the confi rming bank 
for refusing to pay against apparently compliant documents despite the advice 
of  the negotiating bank. The application of  the presumption under Article 
4(2) with regard to the contracts between the seller/benefi ciary and issuing 
bank, issuing bank and confi rming bank, and confi rming bank and seller led 
to the application of  Indonesian law, and the inconvenience and legal uncer-
tainty envisaged by Mance J if  the presumption had simply been applied to 
these very closely related contracts would not have arisen. However, the Court 
of  Appeal, infl uenced by English common law that gave considerable weight 
to the place of  payment and performance, instead of  the place of  contracting 
and residence of  the parties, held that since the place of  payment and perfor-
mance was in England, where the presentation and checking of  the documents 
was carried out through the bank negotiating on behalf  of  the seller, Article 
4(5) should displace Article 4(2) and govern the relationship between the par-
ties under the letter of  credit.177
Despite the valuable impact the doctrine of  AA has made in letter of  credit 
contracts, some objections should be made to the English approach. First, the 
view that the characteristic performer in the relationship between the issuing 
bank and confi rming bank is that of  the confi rming/advising bank is contro-
175 Supra n 17, 47–49. Reliance was placed on European Asian Bank, supra n 31, 368. 
176 Approved in Marconi Communications, supra n 17, [42]–[43]. Although Mance J claimed to have 
been following the Giuliano–Lagarde Report, supra n 10, in determining the characteristic per-
formance for obligations of  mutual performance, it was apparent from the decision that heavy 
reliance was placed on the common law proper law of  contract in determining the law appli-
cable for a letter of  credit between an issuing and confi rming bank.
177 Marconi Communications, supra n 17, [42]–43], [66]–[67].
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versial.178 It is submitted that it is preferable to apply the principle of  closest 
connection under Article 4(4) of  Rome I since the characteristic performer 
cannot readily be identifi ed. Secondly, the undue elevation of  the place of  
payment/performance (place where the documents are checked and payment 
made against compliant documents) as infl uenced by English common law179 
in both using that factor to determine the characteristic performer and utilising 
it as a signifi cant factor in applying the doctrine of  AA may not be accepted 
by other courts under Article 4 of  Rome I.180 Thus, the Court of  Appeal in 
Marconi Communications should simply have applied Indonesian law through the 
application of  Article 4(2) to the three component contracts that formed the 
core of  the letter of  credit transaction where no inconvenience or legal uncer-
tainty would have arisen as was the case in Bank of  Baroda.181 The Court of  
Appeal’s undue reliance on the contract between the seller and negotiating 
bank based on the place of  payment/performance appears to give too much 
weight to the exception.182
(c) Demand Guarantee (or Performance Bonds) and Counter-Guarantee
English courts under the common law applied the doctrine of  infection to 
contracts of  guarantee (or performance bonds) and counter-guarantees. They 
178 For example, in the Northern Irish case of  Governor & Company of  the Bank of  Ireland v State Bank 
of  India [2011] NIQB 22 [17]–[25] the High court did not follow the decision in Bank of  Baroda 
(though it referred to it) by holding that in a contract between an issuing/reimbursing bank and 
a confi rming/advising bank the characteristic performer is the issuing/reimbursing bank. 
179 European Asian Bank, supra n 31, 368; Offshore International SA, supra n 31, 410–12; Power Curber 
International Ltd, supra n 31, 1240–42.
180 In a Rome Convention case the Northern Irish court in Governor & Company of  the Bank of  Ire-
land, supra n 178, [17]–[25] considered the contract between the issuing/reimbursing bank and 
the confi rming bank/advising bank and held that the issuing/reimbursing bank was the char-
acteristic performer and its principal place of  business was India. Weatherup J also held that 
India was the place of  characteristic performance and the country with which the contract was 
most closely connected. The Northern Irish High Court did not follow the English decision in 
Bank of  Baroda (though it referred to it). Struycken, supra n 28 and Corneloup, supra n 1, para 
14 view Mance J’s approach in Bank of  Baroda as an excuse to apply the law of  the forum. 
181 The application of  Art 4(2) to the three component contracts that formed the core of  the letter 
of  credit transaction in this case should be the correct position both under the Convention and 
Rome I. Furthermore, the application of  the doctrine of  AA can also be utilised through the 
presumption(s) or rules (instead of  utilising the escape clause) to contracts with a very close 
relationship. In other words, if  the Court of  Appeal in Marconi Communications had applied the 
presumption in Art 4(2) to the component contracts that formed the core of  the letter of  credit 
transaction (seller/benefi ciary and issuing bank, issuing bank and confi rming bank, and con-
fi rming bank and seller) as the applicable law (Indonesian law), it will also have been utilising 
the doctrine of  AA in identifying a single law that governed all the contractual relationship of  
the parties under the letter of  credit, including the negotiating bank’s transaction with the seller 
that was governed by English law. In this regard see also Cox v Ergo Versicherung AG, supra n 55, 
[12]–[13]. This approach strengthens the goal of  legal certainty in commercial transactions.
182 In other words, it is a clear manifestation of  the weak presumption approach rejected by the 
CJEU in ICF under Art 4 of  the Convention and inapplicable under Art 4 of  Rome I. See 
also Okoli and Arishe, supra n *. 531.
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applied it in either inferring a choice of  law or determining the legal system of  
the country that had the closest and most real connection with the contract.183 
Thus, English courts under the common law applied the law that governed the 
guarantee (or performance bond) to infect the contract of  counter-guarantee.184 
For the purpose of  applying the doctrine of  infection under the common law, 
the English courts for commercial reasons consistently did not consider the law 
governing the underlying commercial transaction capable of  infecting either 
the guarantee (or performance bond) and the counter-guarantee contract as the 
said contracts were separate and not intimately connected.185 The English High 
Court appears to have adopted the same position under the Convention.186 It is 
very likely that an English court called upon to apply the doctrine of  AA under 
Article 4 of  Rome I will adopt the same position. It is, however, uncertain if  
other courts of  Member States will adopt the same position bearing in mind 
that it has been argued by Professor Struycken that the underlying commercial 
transaction should be capable of  infecting this kind of  contract depending on 
the level of  abstraction.187
Another issue of  particular importance relates to the URDG rules which 
regard the contract of  counter-guarantee as separate from the contract of  
guarantee188 and determine the applicable law based on the place where the 
guarantee or counter-guarantee was issued.189 The URDG rules thus envisage 
the possibility that different laws may govern both contracts.190 The English 
courts under common law rejected this position by treating both contracts as 
intimately connected and deserving of  the application of  the doctrine of  infec-
tion.191 The High Court under the Convention has adopted the same position 
by treating them as related contracts and thus applying a single law to both 
contracts.192 It is very likely that the English court will follow the same path 
under Article 4 of  Rome I.
183 Attock Cement Co Ltd, supra n 91, 1158–59; Turkiye Is Bankasi AS, supra n 99, 135–36; Wahda Bank, 
supra n 1, 409–12.
184 Turkiye Is Bankasi, supra n 99, 135–36; Wahda Bank, supra n 1, 409–12.
185 Attock Cement Co Ltd, supra n 91, 1158–59; Turkiye Is Bankasi AS, supra n 99, 135-36; Wahda Bank, 
supra n 1, 409–12. Again it is uncertain if  this was infl uenced by the UCP rules or merely a 
restatement of  what the position was at common law. See Power Curber International Ltd, supra n 
31. (Lord Denning) at 11239; Cf Attock Cement Co Ltd, ibid; Edward Owen Engineering Limited, supra 
n 171, 159; Marconi Communications, supra n 17, [63].
186 British Arab Bank, supra n 47, [30]–[35].
187 Supra n 28, 23, fn 30.
188 Art 5(b).
189 Art 34.
190 This rule may be of  considerable importance where the parties incorporate the URDG Rules 
into their contract.
191 Attock Cement Co Ltd, supra n 91, 1158–59; Turkiye Is Bankasi AS, supra n 99, 135–36; Wahda Bank, 
supra n 1, 409–12.
192 British Arab Bank, supra n 47, [30]–[35].
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The application of  the doctrine of  AA to a contract of  guarantee and 
counter-guarantee has only been considered once by an English court under 
the Convention in the case of  British Arab. In that case, there was a contract 
between GOLD, a Syrian owned entity, and a Chinese company, Sichuan 
Machinery Corporation, in respect of  a project in Syria. GOLD was the owner 
of  the project, while Sichuan Machinery was the contractor. In order to secure 
the performance of  the contractor in the project, the owner required the con-
tractor to issue a performance bond from a Syrian Bank in the owner’s favour. 
The contractor got a Syrian Bank (“CBS”) to issue a performance bond in the 
owner’s favour which was governed expressly by Syrian law. CBS, in a bid to 
allocate its risk, also got an English Bank (“BACB”) to issue a counter-guaran-
tee in its favour, which contained no express choice of  law. BACB in turn got 
a Chinese Bank to issue a counter-guarantee in its favour, which was governed 
by English law. As a term of  the performance bond, the owner made claims 
for extension or payment under the performance bond to CBS. CBS notifi ed 
BACB, and BACB in turn notifi ed BOC. When BACB made a demand for 
extension or payment on the second occasion to BOC, BOC stated that the 
claim under the performance bond had expired and declined to make pay-
ment. There was thus a dispute on the chain of  liability of  the banks that 
issued the performance bond and counter-guarantees for the Syrian project. 
What came for determination before the court was whether Syrian law or Eng-
lish law applied to the contract of  counter-guarantee between CBS and BACB. 
BACB sought the application of  English law that expressly governed the coun-
ter-guarantee with BOC to govern the counter-guarantee with CBS.193 On the 
other hand, CBS sought the application of  Syrian law that expressly governed 
the performance bond issued by BACB in favour of  CBS.194
Blair J did not fi nd the doctrine of  AA suffi cient to imply a choice of  law 
in favour of  either party under Article 3 of  the Convention.195 Blair J moved 
on to consider its application under Article 4 and weighed the signifi cance 
of  the connecting factors as advanced by the parties. Blair J did not consider 
the express choice of  English law governing the counter-guarantee between 
BOC and BACB as relevant because case-law “emphasized the importance of  
the connection to the guarantee rather than the counter-guarantee bank’s own 
security arrangements”.196 Blair J, on the other hand, favoured the argument 
193 Ibid, [26]. The other connecting factors were: (i) any payment by BACB to CBS was due to be 
made in BACB’s account in London, and (ii) the key element of  performance under the coun-
ter-guarantee was the honouring of  the undertaking of  BACB as guarantor, which was located 
in England
194 Ibid. The other connecting factors were: (i) the underlying contract and infrastructure project 
was in Syria, (ii) the place of  payment under the bond was to be in Syria, and (iii) the fact 
that for the counter-guarantee to be triggered there must be a “claim” under the performance 
bond, and what counts as a claim was a matter of  Syrian law
195 Ibid, [30].
196 Ibid, [35].
Vol. 9 No. 3 Journal of  Private International Law 491
of  CBS in applying the (Syrian) law of  the performance bond to the counter-
guarantee. Blair J also emphasised that it “was a condition of  liability under 
the counter-guarantee that CBS received a claim under the performance bond 
from the benefi ciary on or before the expiry date”197 and “the court would 
need to look to Syrian law in relation to the meaning of  ‘claim’ as used in 
both instruments [performance bond and counter-guarantee]”.198 Blair J held 
on this ground that Syrian law was more closely connected in displacing the 
applicability of  English law under Article 4(2) by the application of  Article 4(5).
It is uncertain how this case will play out if  it is to be determined under 
Article 4 of  Rome I. It has been argued based on the strong presumption 
approach that English law is of  real signifi cance and has a substantial con-
nection with the contract of  counter-guarantee because the English party was 
the characteristic performer located in England, and England was both the 
place where the claim for payment was made under the counter-guarantee and 
where the key element of  performance of  honouring the payment undertaken 
as guarantor was to be effected.199 Thus, the presumption in favour of  Eng-
lish law should not be displaced because the law of  Syria does not manifestly 
or suffi ciently outweigh the English connections because they are of  similar 
weight or evenly balanced.200 On the other hand, proponents of  the intermedi-
ary approach could argue that Article 4(3) and Recital 20 apply because even 
if  the English connections are of  real and substantial signifi cance, the appli-
cation of  the doctrine of  AA in favour of  Syrian law manifestly connects the 
contract with Syria, since the performance bond and counter-guarantee are 
very closely related contracts. Adopting this position will also be honouring 
Recital 16 which aims to balance legal certainty and fl exibility in deploying 
the escape clause – a position favoured by the CJEU in ICF under Article 4 
of  the Convention.201
F. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RECITAL 20 AS IT RELATES 
TO THE RULES IN ARTICLE 4(1) AND (2) OF ROME I
The application of  the doctrine of  AA under Recital 21 should ordinarily 
not present considerable diffi culty in so far as the contracts have a very close 
relationship. For example, assume party A from England enters into a joint 
venture with party B from France to drill oil in Imo State, Nigeria. The con-
tract of  joint venture has no express choice of  law, but another joint operating 
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 Okoli and Arishe, supra n *, 533, n 112.
200 Ibid.
201 See also Recital 14 to Rome II. For academic support of  the intermediary approach see Dick-
inson, supra n 123, 36; Beaumont and McEleavy, supra n 9, 475.
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agreement (between the parties) connected with the joint venture agreement is 
expressly governed by Nigerian law. The decision-maker would simply move to 
determine the principle of  closest connection since neither Article 4(1) or (2) 
applies.202 Among other connecting factors the court may consider, considerable 
weight should be given to the application of  Nigerian law to govern the joint 
venture agreement because of  its signifi cance in Recital 21.
Thus, this section is concerned with exposing the dilemma that courts of  
Member States may face in applying the doctrine of  AA under Article 4(3) of  
Rome I. It is particularly concerned with whether the doctrine operates auto-
matically as a connecting factor where it is established that the contracts in 
question have a very close relationship, or whether the court must weigh and 
compare the signifi cance of  other connecting factors in deciding whether or 
not to apply the doctrine. In this regard, the author prefers to take a tenta-
tive view by adopting the position that the application of  the doctrine of  AA 
should be most decisive where it is established that the application of  different 
laws will produce confl icting results as was demonstrated in the English cases 
of  Vesta and Groupama, and the French case of  M Serge Fourez. This section 
also uses concrete examples to illuminate on the disagreement that may arise 
between proponents of  the strong presumption approach and the intermedi-
ary approach. It also considers cases where the doctrine of  AA is insignifi cant 
despite the contracts having a very close relationship.
1. Accessory Allocation in Article 4(1) 
It is easier to displace the presumption in Article 4(2) compared to Article 
4(1).203 Proponents of  the strong presumption approach at the very extreme 
may even argue that the fi xed rules in Article 4(1) should never be displaced 
except when its connection to the contract is so weak that it is of  no signifi -
cance whatsoever to the contract.204 It may be diffi cult to utilise the doctrine 
of  AA under Article 4(3) in displacing Article 4(1) where it is quantitatively 
outweighed by other connecting factors. Let us consider the following scenario 
below.
Assume a contract is entered into by a Norwegian Company (“the Oper-
ator”) habitually resident in Aberdeen, Scotland with a Scottish company 
habitually resident in Aberdeen, Scotland (“the Contractor”) for the supply of  
heat exchangers to use in North Sea operations in Aberdeen. The main con-
202 Scott v West and others; Mackie v Baxter and Others [2012] EWHC1890 (Ch) [10]–[11].
203 This is because it is easier to apply the fi xed rules in Art 4(1) since the contracts are not as 
complex as the contracts under Art 4(2), where the application of  the escape clause is a more 
attractive solution. See also Okoli and Arishe, supra n *, 534.
204 Société Nouvelle des Papeteries de l’AA SA v BV Machinefabriek BOA [1992] Nederlandse jurispruden-
tie 750; reaffi rmed in Baros AG (Switzerland) v Embrica Martim Hotelschiffe GmBH [Hoge Road, 
17 October 2008, No C07/037HR; LJN: BE7201]; Caledonia Subsea, supra n 19, [3], [6] (Lord 
Cameron), [2]–[4] (Lord Marnoch).
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tract for the supply of  heat exchangers has no express choice of  law, but there 
is a Mutual Indemnity and Hold Harmless (MIHH) agreement contained in 
the main contract between the Operator and Contractor that is to be construed 
in accordance with Norwegian law. However, the contract for the supply of  
heat exchangers is negotiated and concluded in Aberdeen. The place of  per-
formance for the supply of  the heat exchangers is in Aberdeen. The place of  
payment is in Aberdeen and payment to be made in Scottish pounds sterling. 
The contract is also written in the English language. A dispute subsequently 
arises between the parties. The Operator sues the Contractor for breach of  
contract in supplying defective component parts for the heat exchangers. There 
is an argument as to the applicable law before the court. The Operator in 
relying on the doctrine of  AA argues that Norwegian law should apply (under 
Article 4(3) and Recital 20) to the contract of  supply of  heat exchangers based 
on the MIHH contract that is to be construed in accordance with Norwe-
gian law. The Contractor, on the contrary, argues that Scots law should apply 
under Article 4(1)(a) since its habitual residence is in Scotland. In the alterna-
tive, under Article 4(3) Scots law should apply since the connecting factors of  
the place of  performance, place of  payment, currency of  payment, residence 
of  the parties and language of  the contract all have Scottish connections that 
outweigh the application of  the doctrine of  AA.
If  the court is to favour the strong presumption approach, it may simply 
hold that the law of  Scotland applies under Article 4(1)(a) since the Contractor 
was habitually resident in Scotland. In the alternative, the court could also hold 
that under Article 4(3) the Norwegian connections do not outweigh the Scot-
tish connections under the contract despite the MIHH agreement contained 
in the contract that is to be governed by Norwegian law. This is because both 
parties were habitually resident in Scotland, contract was written in English, 
the place of  payment was in Scotland, the currency was that of  Scotland, and 
the place of  performance had very strong connections with Scotland where 
the contractor performed his services. If  the court is to favour the intermedi-
ary approach, it may hold that the contracts for the supply of  heat exchangers 
and the MIHH (having a very close relationship) between the same parties 
should lead to the application of  Norwegian law under Article 4(3) and Recital 
20 through the doctrine of  AA that is of  special and considerable signifi cance 
as a connecting factor. The court may further hold that despite the real and 
substantial Scottish connections that support the application of  Article 4(1)(a), 
the law of  Norway is manifestly more closely connected with the contract, and 
the place of  performance, the language of  the contract, currency of  payment 
and habitual residence of  the parties should not be given considerable signifi -
cance, where contracts that have a very close relationship are involved, as it is 
the doctrine of  AA that should be the signifi cant and decisive connecting factor 
in that circumstance from the reading of  Recitals 20 and Recital 16. In other 
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words, the court should consider and weigh the signifi cance of  the connecting 
factors in the circumstance and not mechanically utilise the connecting factors 
in a quantitative manner.
2. Accessory Allocation in Article 4(2)
The same scenario referred to in Article 4(1) may also arise in Article 4(2), 
where the doctrine of  AA is quantitatively outweighed by other competing con-
necting factors. Let us consider the following scenario below.
Assume a US company (“the Operator”), habitually resident in Aberdeen, 
enters into a contract of  charterparty for the supply of  a vessel at the North 
Sea with a Scottish company (“the Charterer”), habitually resident in Scot-
land. The contract of  charterparty is expressly governed by Massachusetts law, 
but there is a contract of  guarantee contained in the charterparty without an 
express choice of  law. The party guaranteeing the obligations of  the charterer 
is also another Scottish company (“the Guarantor”), habitually resident in Scot-
land. The contract of  guarantee is negotiated and concluded in Aberdeen. The 
place of  performance of  the Guarantor’s obligation is in Aberdeen. The place 
of  payment is in Aberdeen and payment is to be made in Scottish pounds 
sterling. A dispute subsequently arises between the Operator and Charterer 
because the Charterer delayed in supplying the Vessel. The Operator sues the 
Charterer and Guarantor. There is a dispute as to what law applies to the con-
tract of  guarantee. The Operator advocates the application of  Massachusetts 
law to the contract of  guarantee, but the Charterer and Guarantor advocate 
the application of  Scots law. If  the court is to apply the strong presumption 
approach, it may simply hold that the law of  Scotland applies under Article 
4(2) since the Guarantor, as the characteristic performer, is habitually resident 
in Scotland.205 In the alternative, the court could also hold that under Article 
4(3) the US connection(s) does not outweigh the Scottish connections under 
the contract despite the contract of  charterparty that is expressly governed by 
Massachusetts law. This is because the Operator, Charterer and Guarantor are 
habitually resident in Scotland, the place of  payment is in Scotland, the cur-
rency of  payment is that of  Scotland, and the place of  performance has very 
strong connections with Scotland where the Guarantor is to perform his obli-
gation. If  the court is to favour the intermediary approach, it may hold that 
the contracts of  charterparty and guarantee (having a very close relationship) 
205 A contract of  guarantee is neither a contract of  sale nor one for the provision of  services under 
Art 4(1) of  Rome I and is therefore to be determined under Art 4(2) of  Rome I. Commercial 
Marine Piling Ltd, supra n 17. The decision in Commercial Marine, ibid, approached the applica-
tion of  Art 5 of  Brussels I from the perspective that the contract of  guarantee was neither a 
contract for sale nor provision of  services, and applied Art 5(1)(a) of  Brussels I instead of  Art 
5(1)(b). See also Recital 17 and 7 of  Rome I that emphasises a synergy in the interpretation of  
sale of  goods and provision of  services in Brussels I and Rome I.
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between the same parties should lead to the application of  Massachusetts law 
under Article 4(3) and Recital 20 through the application of  the doctrine of  
AA that is of  special signifi cance as a connecting factor. The court may further 
hold that despite the real and substantial Scottish connections that support the 
application of  Article 4(2), the law of  Massachusetts is manifestly closely con-
nected with the contract, and the place of  performance, currency of  payment 
and habitual residence of  the parties should not be attributed considerable sig-
nifi cance, where contracts that have a very close relationship are involved, as it 
is the doctrine of  AA that should be the signifi cant and decisive factor in that 
circumstance from the reading of  Recital 20 and Recital 16. In other words, 
the court should consider and weigh the signifi cance of  the connecting factors 
in the circumstances and not mechanically utilise the connecting factors in a 
quantitative manner.
3. Where Accessory Allocation Is Insignifi cant
It is submitted that the doctrine of  AA should not be utilised despite the con-
tracts having a very close relationship in at least three situations.
First, where there are more than two contracts that have a very close rela-
tionship and they are governed by the express choice of  law of  two different 
countries, the doctrine of  AA should not be utilised to govern another con-
tract that has a very close relationship with both those contracts. The court 
should regard such a situation as a stalemate and look to the signifi cance of  
other connecting factors. Let us assume that in a letter of  credit contract, the 
issuing bank (a Nigerian bank habitually resident in Nigeria) and benefi ciary 
(a Nigerian seller) in their correspondence expressly choose Nigerian law to 
govern their contract, the confi rming bank (a French bank habitually resident 
in France) and benefi ciary in their correspondence expressly choose French law 
to govern their contract, but the confi rming bank and issuing bank make no 
express choice of  law. It is submitted here that in this case neither Nigerian law 
nor French law should automatically lay claim to being manifestly more closely 
connected with the contract of  the confi rming and issuing bank based on the 
application of  the doctrine of  AA. There is a stalemate and the doctrine of  AA 
should be regarded as insignifi cant. The court must weigh the signifi cance of  
other connecting factors such as the place of  payment and performance, terms 
of  the contract and object of  the contract, place of  negotiation and conclusion, 
and language of  the contract in determining which law applies under Article 4.
Second, where the express choice of  law has been vitiated by the court on 
grounds of  fraud, duress, undue infl uence or failure to protect a weaker party, 
the court should not use that express choice of  law that has been vitiated 
to infect the other contract(s). For example, assume a lease contract governed 
by French law is entirely voided by the court because the landlord made the 
tenant sign the contract (including the applicable law) under duress. In this case 
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the court should not use that same express choice of  law to govern the contract 
guaranteeing the lease agreement by the application of  the doctrine of  AA. It 
is indeed possible that if  the court applies Article 4, it may reach the conclu-
sion that French law applies to the contract of  guarantee. But this must not be 
done by the application of  the doctrine of  AA. This view produces just results 
in protecting weaker parties and also produces certainty in making the escape 
clause an exceptional remedy.206
Third, Professor Corneloup considers three scenarios (distribution contract 
followed by successive sales, joint venture agreement followed by successive loan 
and sales agreement, and loan agreement secured by a real estate collateral) 
where the (principal) contract falls within the scope of  Rome I, but the other 
(ancillary) contract(s) falls to be determined by another PIL statute such as the 
Hague Convention that the Member State court is also a party to. Professor 
Corneloup submits that Recital 20 or 21 cannot apply in this situation. To do 
so would be to import considerations that determine the applicable law from 
one PIL statute into another.207 It is submitted that the same position should 
also apply to situations where the law applicable to the principal contract in the 
absence of  an express choice of  law has already been determined in a (fi rst) 
court that is not a party to Rome I or Brussels I, or one that applies a different 
PIL rule in the determination of  the applicable law as was the case in Lexington 
discussed above. It may be illegitimate for the second court to utilise the law 
applicable to the principal contract in the absence of  choice as determined 
under a foreign PIL rule to infect the ancillary contract under consideration.
G. CONCLUSION
The framers of  Rome I elevated the doctrine of  AA as a special connect-
ing factor under Article 4(3) and (4). The application of  the doctrine under 
the Convention is by no means free from controversy, especially in English 
courts. The author takes the position that the rationale for elevating the doc-
trine of  AA to one of  special signifi cance among other connecting factors in 
determining the applicable law in the absence of  choice principally rests on 
206 A similar view has been expressed in respect of  the application of  the doctrine of  AA under 
Art 4(3) of  Rome II: Okoli and Arishe, supra n *, 539–41; see also Hillside (New Media) Limited 
v Biarte Baasland [2010] EWHC 1941 (QB) [42], [43], [46]; T Kadner Graziano, “Freedom 
to Choose the Applicable Law in Tort – Articles 14 and 4(3) of  the Rome II Regulation” in 
Ahern and Binchy, supra n 97, 125–27; Cf Sapporo Breweries Ltd v Lupofresh Ltd [2012] EWHC 
2013 (QB) [41]–[46]; Th M De Boer, “Party Autonomy and its Limitations in the Rome II 
Regulation” (2007) 9 Yearbook of  Private International Law 19, 27–28; Fawcett and Carruthers, supra 
n 135, 802–03; Dickinson, supra n 123, 345–47; A Rushworth and A Scott, “Rome II: Choice 
of  Law for Non-contractual Obligations” [2008] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 
274, 280–01, 303–05.
207 Supra n 1, paras 16–19.
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convenience, reconciling the goals of  legal certainty and fl exibility, and enhanc-
ing the sound administration of  justice.
There are, however, certain challenges or issues that will confront Member 
State courts in honouring Recitals 20 and 21 to Rome I. The fi rst is the deter-
mination of  whether the doctrine of  AA takes principal signifi cance in Article 
3 or Article 4. The second is the determination of  whether the distinction 
between connections to legal system or geography is of  signifi cance in apply-
ing the doctrine of  AA under Article 4. The third is the guide or measure to 
determining which types of  contracts have a very close relationship and are 
deserving of  the application of  the doctrine of  AA. Furthermore, even where 
the contracts are certainly very close (such as back-to-back contracts), prob-
lems arise as to whether the doctrine of  AA applies in all cases, and where it 
applies, the proper approach to utilising the doctrine. The fourth challenge is 
to measure how signifi cant the doctrine of  AA is under Article 4 in displacing 
the main rule(s) when compared with other important factors. The fi nal issue is 
the possibility that the doctrine may turn out to be insignifi cant in certain cases 
even where the contracts in question have a very close relationship.
The above issues, though discussed and analysed in this article, expose the 
danger that uniformity and legal certainty may be threatened among Member 
State courts under Article 4 while honouring Recitals 20 and 21. Indeed, if  the 
doctrine of  AA is to be taken seriously by courts of  Member States while inter-
preting Article 4(3) and (4), the European legislators, the CJEU and academics 
need to take the challenge further by providing more clarity on the relationship 
between Recitals 20 and 21, and Article 4 of  Rome I.
